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ABSTRACT 
 
This study set out to establish statistical relationships between matters relating to governance and 
changes in Zambia’s socioeconomic development. With the aid of survey data compiled by the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, and perceptions of governance amongst 
Zambian citizens obtained from Round 5 of the Afrobarometer survey, this study used 
quantitative research methods to investigate the performance of indicators of governance in 
Zambia between 1996 and 2012 and the perceptions that Zambians had toward matters relating 
to governance. The indicators and perceptions of governance were based on measures of Control 
of Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Voice and Accountability.  
 
The study further addressed the changes in Zambia’s socioeconomic development by 
investigating trends in Zambia’s Human Development Index between 1996 and 2012. The study 
also established the extent of lived poverty in Zambia by addressing how Zambians rated their 
living conditions based on how much access they had to essential commodities such as food, 
cooking fuel, water and cash income. 
 
Using SPSS, this study calculated the correlations between the measures of governance and the 
measures of socioeconomic development. The evidence shows that indicators and perceptions of 
governance are associated with changes in measures of socioeconomic development in Zambia. 
The evidence, as well as an analysis of political and economic reforms in Zambia, made it 
possible to conclude that for Zambians to have better perceptions about their living conditions 
there is need for strong democratic systems and institutions. These should be accompanied by 
effective political leadership that can address social and economic concerns and reform 
institutions charged with combating corruption and upholding the rule of law. 
 
This study determined that WGI data was subjective and needed to be used with caution. Despite 
this, the study found that when used in conjunction with data on perceptions of governance 
amongst Zambian citizens, it was possible to determine that matters related to political 
governance were crucial to socioeconomic development in Zambia. Therefore, the study 
concluded that the roles played by institutions such as the World Bank and NEPAD were crucial 
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for ensuring that the political leadership was held accountable to promoting good governance 
and socioeconomic development in Zambia. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction to the study 
In the early 1990s, the Zambian government implemented IMF and World Bank driven 
Structural Adjustment Programmes which were aimed at stabilising and restructuring the 
economy, and at stimulating growth after close to two decades of continuous economic decline 
(Whitworth, 2013: 25). By 2011, Zambia’s macroeconomic fundamentals had never been in 
“better shape” (Whitworth, 2013: 31). GDP grew by over 75 per cent between 2002 and 2011, 
and the poverty headcount fell from 68.1 per cent in 1996 to 59.3 per cent in 2006 while extreme 
poverty declined from 44.5 per cent to 36.5 per cent over the same period (Whitworth, 2013). 
Despite this, the period between 1992 and 2011 has also been associated with alleged increases 
in corruption, increasing inequality, lack of employment opportunities and a slow pace in the 
reduction of poverty in Zambia (Whitworth, 2013: 31). 
 
For many decades, efforts have been made to address the myriad social and economic challenges 
not only in Zambia but in Africa at large. It has also been recognised that addressing the 
problems in Africa requires an understanding of the factors that contribute to the continent’s 
challenges. In the last five decades, Africa’s problems have been attributed to various factors 
such as the effects of colonialism, neo-imperialism, poor geographic conditions, widespread 
conflict and aid dependence among others. 
 
In more recent times, some analysts have argued that the problems of poverty and 
underdevelopment on the African continent are due to matters related to governance such as poor 
policies, corruption, lack of state capacity and poor political leadership (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012; Herbst and Mills, 2012; Mills, 2010).  Multilateral institutions such as the 
World Bank have also been advocating for the adoption of good governance principles as a 
prerequisite for development in poor countries since the start of the 1990s. These calls have their 
origins in the analyses of Burnside and Dollar who explained that development assistance would 
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be effective only in countries that had adopted good governance and good policies (Hout, 2010: 
2).  
 
It is possible, therefore, that aspects of governance may be associated with socioeconomic 
development in Zambia. However, no study has yet confirmed this. 
 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
Recent studies have found that factors related to governance such as corruption can impact 
negatively on human development (Ackay, 2006; Gupta et al, 2000). Other studies have found 
that the effectiveness of governments and the policies they pursue contribute to economic growth 
and human development outcomes (Hutchinson and Schumacher, 1995; Kaufmann and Kraay, 
2002). Establishing whether these and other factors related to governance are associated with 
Zambia’s socioeconomic development can only be ascertained by research.  
 
The continuous calls by institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, United Nations and NEPAD 
for poor countries to adopt good governance also inspired this study to address the claim that 
governance was central to attaining development. Further, this study was also interested in 
learning the perceptions that Zambians had toward matters relating to governance and their 
living conditions.  
 
Therefore, this study aimed to establish statistical relationships between matters relating to 
Zambia’s governance and socioeconomic development. This involved investigating the changes 
in indicators of matters concerning governance and of human development, and the perceptions 
of citizens about matters concerning governance and their living conditions. This was followed 
by establishing the correlations between the measures of governance and of socioeconomic 
development.   
 
1.3 Motivation for the study 
This study was motivated by the works of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), Herbst and Mills 
(2012), Mbeki (2009) and Mills (2010) who have made compelling arguments blaming Africa’s 
poverty and underdevelopment on corrupt and inefficient political leadership and weak state 
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institutions. Particularly, these authors have demonstrated that the inability for political leaders 
on the African continent to transform underperforming institutions, to diversify economies and 
adopt sound economic policies has in large part contributed to the high incidence of poverty and 
inequality, a high disease burden, and unemployment in Africa.  
 
These arguments appeared to explain why Zambia remains beset with social and economic 
challenges. Therefore, addressing the extent to which statistics measuring matters relating to 
governance are associated with measures of socioeconomic development served as a means 
through which the impact of political leadership on Africa’s development could be investigated. 
It further served as a means to confirm whether the arguments made by the authors referred to 
above could be used to explain Zambia’s socioeconomic problems. The findings of this study 
could prove useful to individuals and institutions concerned with not only understanding factors 
associated with Zambia’s social and economic challenges but that are also interested in 
addressing matters related to governance in an effort to effect positive socioeconomic 
development outcomes. 
 
The choice of Zambia as a country of focus was motivated by the fact that as a Zambian, I was 
interested in understanding why the country remained poor despite having had one of the best 
performing economies in Africa during the 1960s. Also, given that Zambia is an aid recipient 
country, this study could bring attention to important factors relating to governance that need to 
be addressed to ensure the effective use of aid and the attainment of socioeconomic 
development.    
 
1.4 Research Questions 
This research sets out to address the following question: Are perceptions and indicators of 
governance associated with measures of socioeconomic development in Zambia? 
 
To answer the general research question required answers to the following specific questions: 
 
1. What has been the performance of indicators of governance in Zambia? 
2. What have been the changes in Zambia’s HDI? 
3. What perceptions do Zambian citizens have about governance in their country? 
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4. How do Zambians rate their present living conditions? 
5. Are changes in indicators of governance associated with changes in HDI in Zambia? 
6. What is the association between citizens’ perceptions about governance and the Lived 
Poverty Index in Zambia?  
 
1.5 Conceptualisation of the problem 
This study used indicators of governance obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
for the years 1996 to 2012 and the 2012 Afrobarometer survey. It also used UNDP and 
Afrobarometer indicators of socioeconomic development. The indicators were useful for 
understanding the association between trends in indicators of governance and of socioeconomic 
development at country level while also understanding the perceptions of Zambian citizens 
regarding matters relating to governance and their living conditions.   
 
Therefore, central to meeting the objectives of this research were the following terms and 
concepts: “governance”, “control of corruption”, “government effectiveness”, “rule of law”, 
“voice and accountability” and “socioeconomic development”. These terms and concepts are 
defined below.  
 
1.5.1 Governance 
The term “governance” is very broad and has been subjected to various interpretations. This 
study relies heavily on the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) developed by Kaufmann et 
al (2010) and therefore also adopts the definition of governance they provided. Kaufmann et al 
defined governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised 
(Kaufmann et al 2010: 4). This includes the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement 
sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic 
and social interactions among them (Kaufmann et al 2010: 4). Kaufmann et al (2010) took on 
this definition in an attempt to embrace existing notions of governance that also permitted the 
construction of indicators of governance that this study uses and describes below.  
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1.5.2 Control of Corruption 
The WGI measure Control of Corruption by collecting perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well 
as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests (Kaufmann et al, 2009: 6). This study also 
investigated the perceptions that Zambians had about the existence of corruption in public 
institutions and amongst public officials.  
 
1.5.3 Government Effectiveness 
The WGI measure Government Effectiveness by gathering perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies (Kaufmann et al, 2009: 6). In addition to this, the 
study investigated the perceptions that Zambians had about the effectiveness of the government 
in handling a range of social and economic matters. 
 
1.5.4 Rule of Law 
The WGI measure Rule of Law by capturing perceptions of the extent to which citizens have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence (Kaufmann et al, 2009: 6). The levels of trust that Zambians had with institutions 
charged with upholding the Rule of Law were also investigated. 
 
1.5.5 Voice and Accountability 
The WGI measure Voice and Accountability by gathering perceptions of the extent to which a 
country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media (Kaufmann et al 2009: 6). 
 
While the measure of Voice and Accountability provided by the WGI takes into account both 
measures of freedom and democratic performance, Afrobarometer survey data, which is used in 
this research to capture Zambian citizens’ perceptions on matters pertaining to governance and 
living conditions, provides information on democratic satisfaction and on freedoms that could 
not be combined to compute a variable using factor analysis. Taking this perspective, in 
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computing a variable for Voice and Accountability, this research focused solely on question 
items in the Afrobarometer dataset that collected perceptions on democratic satisfaction. 
 
1.5.6 Socioeconomic development 
In this study, socioeconomic development was used to refer to both social and economic factors 
related to development such as education, health, income and essential commodities such as 
food, water and cooking fuel. This is opposed to other measures of development that place 
emphasis on economic factors only such as GDP. This study also aimed to understand changes in 
indicators of socioeconomic development at a country level while also understanding how 
Zambian citizens experienced poverty. It follows, therefore, that the Human Development Index 
(HDI) and the Lived Poverty Index were used as measures of socioeconomic development. The 
study was influenced by Sen’s capability approach to development. For this reason, 
socioeconomic development was conceptualized as a form of development that took into account 
the quality of life, the freedoms that people enjoyed to live the kind of lives they desired, as well 
as the capabilities they possessed to avoid premature mortality, significant undernourishment, 
persistent morbidity and widespread illiteracy among others (Robeyns, 2005; Sen, 1999).  
 
This chapter has provided the background that underpins this study. The chapter has also 
highlighted the surveys and indicators that will be used to establish statistical relationships 
between matters relating to governance and socioeconomic development.  
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 General Debate on Governance and Development 
Studies such as Kaufmann et al (2009) have established that matters concerning governance 
contribute to changes in development. Other studies such as Gupta et al (2000) have found that 
measures relating to governance were strongly correlated to measures of socioeconomic 
development but did not establish causality between governance and development. This position 
is largely motivated by the lack of consensus within literature on whether changes in matters 
relating to governance lead to changes in development or whether causality runs in the opposite 
direction. 
 
On the contrary, there are debates that question whether governance is necessary for 
development at all. Goldsmith (2007) shows with evidence from the United States of America 
(when it was a developing country), Argentina, Jamaica and Mauritius that governance reform 
may not necessarily be a catalyst for development. The evidence from the four countries shows 
that governance reform can be a result of economic growth and rapid development rather than a 
cause (Goldsmith, 2007). Provided conditions exist for an upsurge in production and income, 
economic growth can be achieved which can in turn trigger demands by an emerging middle 
class for strong anti-corruption measures and a meritocratic civil service which have the effect of 
promoting institutions that reform governance. 
 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) also contributed to the governance debate and have stated that 
while statistical evidence may exist confirming the importance of governance to development, 
this cannot be said to be true for all countries. Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) provided 
statistical analysis showing that reforming institutions of governance does not always translate 
into positive socioeconomic outcomes. In Latin America for example, there were sustained 
economic gains in some countries despite them having alternated between democracies and 
dictatorships over a period of several decades (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). The statistical 
analysis provided by Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) showed that when taken as a whole, there 
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was no clear trend in Latin America to suggest that good governance was responsible for 
economic performance. Rather, the evidence differed from one country to the next making it 
difficult to conclude that governance was indeed responsible or even associated to changes in 
development.  
 
While the debate above has focused on the importance of governance to development, this 
chapter engages with literature that discusses the association between measures relating to 
governance and measures of socioeconomic development. The literature review that follows also 
recognises the debates on causality between measures of governance and of socioeconomic 
development. This chapter also discusses definitions and methodological issues relating to each 
of the indicators. This study takes into account that there are varying definitions for factors 
associated with governance and as such the manner in which measures relating to governance are 
conceived and calculated could have an influence on statistical results. This was a concern with 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators that have come under considerable scrutiny in recent 
years.  
 
Since the study employs HDI and Lived Poverty Index as measures for socioeconomic 
development, the literature reviewed discusses the findings from studies that have investigated 
the relationship between matters concerning governance on the one hand and constituent 
indicators of the two measures such as education, health, income and food on the other. The 
chapter also discusses literature on the association between matters concerning governance and 
HDI as a composite index. The LPI was developed relatively recently and there is hardly any 
literature on the association between governance indicators and LPI as a composite index.    
 
2.2 Corruption and Socioeconomic Development 
This section discusses the relationship between measures relating to corruption and measures of 
socioeconomic development. To discuss this relationship, this section engages with literature that 
addresses the relationship between corruption and HDI as a composite measure, and also engages 
with works that address the relationship between corruption and indicators of education, health 
and income.  
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2.2.1 Definitional and methodological debates on Corruption  
This study is concerned with understanding the relationship between corruption in the public 
sector and development. This concern is informed by the fact that this study is interested in 
addressing the association between political governance and socioeconomic development. 
Accordingly, the study focuses on corruption as it relates to the role of governments and state 
institutions.  
 
In defining corruption, Gupta et al (1998) note that corruption occurs when: “government 
officials use their authority for private gain in designing and implementing policies”. This 
suggests that corruption has the effect of distorting the allocation of government resources, with 
possible consequences for the most marginalised citizens who tend to be more dependent on 
receiving support from the state through the provision of public services such as education and 
healthcare.   
 
Ackay (2006) also notes that: “corruption is a symptom of deep institutional weaknesses and 
leads to inefficient economic, social, and political outcomes”. The argument Ackay (2006) 
makes indicates that corruption has a negative impact on matters such as economic growth and 
poverty reduction. In this way, corruption can precipitate inequalities in income distribution, lead 
to increases in child and mortality rates, and contribute to increased poverty (Ackay, 2006: 40). 
For these reasons, corruption is largely associated with adverse economic outcomes and it is no 
surprise that advocates of “good governance” regard corruption as one factor that militates 
against the effective use of aid. By extension, this also gives credibility to the view that 
corruption engenders poverty and underdevelopment. 
 
Even though the link between corruption and development appears to be clear, realizing that 
most measures of corruption are based on perceptions rather than actual measurements of 
corruption can be viewed as a challenge that this study needs to take caution of. Kaufmann et al 
(2009) have shown in their report that their composite indicator of Control of Corruption is based 
on perceptions about corruption collected from experts and household surveys. The implication 
is that any statistical analysis between corruption and development will be based on perceptions 
about corruption regardless of whether the perceptions accurately reflect the reality of corruption 
or not. Notwithstanding the methodological debates relating to corruption, the next section 
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reviews literature that addresses the relationship between measures of corruption and of 
socioeconomic development.  
 
2.2.2 Relationship between Measures of Corruption and Measures of Socioeconomic 
Development 
To investigate the relationship between corruption and development requires an understanding of 
whether corruption retards development as has been suggested by advocates of “good 
governance.” Addressing this problem, Ackay (2006: 46) in a quantitative study of 63 countries 
aimed to establish the impact of corruption on human development. By using the urbanization 
rate, economic freedom, democracy, and corruption as independent variables (as well as 
functions of human development), and the 1998 HDI as a dependent variable, Ackay ran a series 
of regression tests. In an attempt to measure the strength of the relationship between corruption 
and human development, Ackay (2006) ran three regression analyses each with a different 
measure of corruption. The three measures were the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) compiled 
by Transparency International (TI), International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) corruption index 
compiled by Political Risk Services (PRS), and the WGI corruption index constructed by 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003) (Ackay, 2006: 36). In all three regression tests, Ackay 
found negative and statistically significant coefficient estimates suggesting that highly corrupt 
countries tended to have low levels of human development. In the first test, Ackay found that a 
one point increase in the corruption index reduced human development by 0.013 points, while 
one point increases in the second and third corruption indices led to reductions in human 
development by 0.048 and 0.041 points, respectively (Ackay, 2006: 44).   
 
The finding that corruption retards human development can be explained by understanding that 
human development encompasses elements of education, health and income. In any country, the 
provision of education and health services requires financial spending which in most cases is 
provided by the state. Corruption by public officials therefore has the effect of diverting the 
financial resources meant for social programmes resulting in poor access to education and 
healthcare services by the affected citizens. To gain a further understanding of the relationship 
between corruption and education, health and income, this chapter turns to literature that 
addresses these debates specifically.   
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Gupta et al (2000) tested the relationship between corruption and government service provision 
for a group of 71 countries. The results of this study showed a strong negative correlation 
between corruption and service provision (Gupta et al, 2000). The correlation coefficients ran 
from -0.59 to -0.66 and show that countries with less corruption had better quality of healthcare 
and more efficient public services (Gupta et al, 2000: 9).  
 
In a statistical analysis similar to the above, Gupta et al (2000) tested the relationship between 
corruption and child mortality. The analysis involved a simple regression of the child mortality 
rate on a constant, the index of corruption, and the indicator of quality of healthcare provision for 
62 countries. The results show that corruption led to increases in child and infant mortality rates, 
and also increases in the percentage of low-birth weight babies in total births (Gupta et al, 2000: 
9).  Similar analyses on education show that corruption was also associated with increased 
dropout rates in primary school (Gupta et al, 2000).  
 
Recognizing that HDI also encompasses a measure of income, it is useful to address the 
association between corruption and matters relating to citizens’ access to income. Attempts have 
been made to address this concern by investigating the relationship between corruption on one 
hand and income inequality and poverty on the other.  
 
With the aid of statistical analysis, Gupta et al (1998) investigated the relationship between 
corruption and income inequality. The analysis was anchored on the Atkinson (1997) empirical 
model of inequality1. The model of income inequality was based on cross country data for the 
period 1980 to 1997 obtained from the World Bank’s 1997 World Development Report. The 
results of the income inequality regression show that corruption was associated with higher 
income inequality at the one percent level of significance (Gupta et al, 1998). A worsening in the 
                                                             
1 The model specifies the personal distribution of income in terms of factor endowments, distribution of factors of 
production, and government spending on social programmes. Specifically, the gini coefficient is assumed to depend 
on the following variables: Initial distribution of assets (the initial gini coefficient for land ownership); Education 
inequality (percent of adult population with no schooling expressed as a fraction or percent of adult population with 
completed secondary and higher education); Education stock or educational attainment (average years of secondary 
education in population aged 15 and over); Capital stock to GDP ratio; Natural resource endowment (share of 
natural resources in total exports); Corruption (various corruption indices); Social spending (various spending 
measures relative to GDP); as well as an expenditure dummy, a recipient dummy and a net income dummy (Gupta 
et al 1998: pp8-9). 
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corruption index of a country by one standard deviation (2.52 points on a scale of 0 to 10) was 
associated with an increase in the Gini coefficient of about 4.4 points (Gupta et al, 1998: 14). 
 
A similar regression model2 was designed to test the relationship between corruption and 
poverty. The results show that higher growth in corruption was associated with lower income 
growth for the poor. The results further show that a one standard deviation increase in the growth 
rate of corruption (a deterioration of 0.78 percentage points) led to a reduction in income growth 
of the bottom 20 percent of the population by 7.8 percentage points per year (Gupta et al, 1998: 
21). 
 
In light of their findings, Gupta et al (1998) posited that: “corruption interferes with the 
traditional core functions of government: allocation of resources, stabilization of the economy, 
and redistribution of income”. They also stated that the traditional functions of the government 
influenced income distribution and poverty in varying degrees, both directly and indirectly 
(Gupta et al, 1998). 
 
The foregoing analysis of literature provides evidence of statistical relationships between 
measures of corruption and of socioeconomic development. The literature not only shows 
evidence of association between the two variables but also shows that measures of corruption 
contribute to changes in measures of socioeconomic development.  
 
2.3 Government Effectiveness and Socioeconomic Development 
Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) have established that Government Effectiveness is positively 
correlated with per capita income. Regression results for 144 countries where five measures of 
governance, including Government Effectiveness were used as independent variables and in 
which per capita GDP was used as the dependent variable show that countries with better 
governance generally had higher levels of per capita income. The results suggest that the 
effectiveness of governments is central to attaining higher economic growth rates. This section 
reviews literature that addresses the relationship between Government Effectiveness and not only 
                                                             
2 The regression contained the following variables: a constant, natural resource abundance, initial income of the 
poor, initial secondary schooling, and growth in corruption. The three remaining variables are education inequality, 
initial Gini coefficient for land and social spending (Gupta et al, 1998: 14). 
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income, but other measures that are relevant to socioeconomic development as well. Before 
doing that however, the section discusses definitional and methodological issues pertaining to 
Government Effectiveness.  
 
2.3.1 Definitional and methodological debates on Government Effectiveness 
Debates regarding Government Effectiveness are rooted in the belief that governments are 
central to improving human well-being and achieving economic growth (Hutchinson and 
Schumacher, 1995). According to the UNDP, which has promoted the concept of human 
development since the early 1990s, it is the responsibility of the government sector to ensure 
personal and national security as well as to provide physical and social infrastructure 
(Hutchinson and Schumacher, 1995: 251).  The UNDP also contends that the government sector 
should have oversight in redistributing income to the poor, encouraging the creation of 
productive, remunerative, and satisfying employment and promoting people-centered 
development (Hutchinson and Schumacher, 1995: 251).  
 
Despite the fact that neoliberals and advocates of people centered development emphasize a 
reduced role for the state in favour of the markets and bottom-up development from communities 
respectively, the effectiveness of the state is still considered to be crucial for attaining improved 
economic outcomes and better living conditions. However, within the literature on governance, 
there is no consensus on what is meant by “effectiveness”.  
 
Sacks and Levi (2010) define an effective government as: “one that is capable of protecting the 
population from violence while ensuring the honesty and competence of its bureaucracy and 
enabling the provision and maintenance of infrastructure that makes possible the exchange of 
goods and delivery of services”. From this definition, it is evident that for governments to be 
effective, they should be able to protect citizens, deliver public services and manage economic 
affairs.  
 
To measure Government Effectiveness, Kaufmann and Kraay (2002: 6) “combine perceptions of 
the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil 
servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to policies”. The main focus of this index is on the inputs required for 
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the government to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods 
(Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002: 6). 
 
The measure adopted by Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) differs from other measures of 
Government Effectiveness that have been adopted elsewhere. For example, Putnam (cited by Lee 
and Whitford, 2009) identified three dimensions of government performance: “policy processes, 
which include cabinet stability, budget promptness, and statistical and information services; 
policy pronouncements such as reform legislation and legislative innovation; and policy 
implementation, including, for example, industrial policy instruments, agricultural spending 
capacity, local health unit expenditures, housing and urban development, and bureaucratic 
responsiveness”. To a large extent, the difference between the two measures of Government 
Effectiveness is that the former focuses more on the results of the governments’ handling of 
matters while the latter focuses more on the processes and policies adopted by governments. Lee 
and Whitford (2009: 250) describe Putnam’s dimension of Government Effectiveness as one that 
focuses on measuring capacity more than performance. For this reason, Kaufmann and Kraay 
(2002) offer a more useful measure of Government Effectiveness owing to the fact that they 
focus on performance. Focusing on performance is useful for this study because it makes it 
possible to address the performance of governments in relation to their handling of matters that 
concern socioeconomic development. 
 
Even then, the measurement of Government Effectiveness offered by Kaufmann and Kraay 
(2002) has some limitations. It has been argued that Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) base their 
measure on perceptions of Government Effectiveness and not the actual effectiveness of 
governments (Langbein and Knack, 2010). In response to this, Kaufmann et al (2010) argue that 
perceptions matter because respondents base their actions on perceptions, impressions and views. 
This is significant when trying to measure the performance of a government because it is 
expected, at least in a liberal democracy that governments respond to how citizens rate their 
performance even when such ratings are subjective. Nevertheless, Kaufmann et al (2010) 
acknowledge that there are imprecisions in relying on subjective measurements of Government 
Effectiveness, which they attempt to address by highlighting the margins of error in their indices. 
In defence of subjective measures, Lee and Whitford (2009: 254) also note that measures of 
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perceived organizational performance are often correlated with objective measures of 
organizational performance. 
 
In light of the above, it is necessary to be cautious of the fact that some indicators of Government 
Effectiveness are based on measuring actual performance while others are based on perceptions. 
This becomes important particularly when interpreting the findings on the effectiveness of 
governments. 
 
2.3.2 Relationship between Measures of Government Effectiveness and Measures of 
Socioeconomic Development 
To test the relationship between Government Effectiveness and human development, Hutchinson 
and Schumacher (1995: 257) conducted a study of thirty-five less developed countries based on 
data availability on various government spending categories from 1972 to 1988 and HDI. The 
study used pooled OLS regressions to estimate the relationship between four independent 
variables: growth in per capita investment; government spending on public goods3; government 
spending on merit goods4; and government spending on economic goods5 and the growth rate of 
the human development index as a dependant variable. The regression results show that 
government expenditures on public, merit and economic goods made a statistically significant 
positive contribution to human development growth (Hutchinson and Schumacher, 1995: 258).  
It is worth noting that the measure of Government Effectiveness used by Hutchinson and 
Schumacher (1995) is an objective measure as it was based on the actual performance of the 
governments with respect to their spending on various types of goods. That government spending 
on merit goods such as education and health led to improved human well-being could be 
attributed to the fact that education and health are both associated with access to opportunities 
that lead to the expansion of human capabilities and improved living conditions. 
 
In another study, Sacks and Levi (2010: 2326) tested a model that described how individuals' 
experiences with government activities had consequences for their social welfare. Sacks and 
Levi (2010: 2326) used third round Afrobarometer data to investigate whether the level of 
                                                             
3 Public goods include general administration, order and safety, defence and road safety. 
4 Merit goods denote education, health, community affairs, culture, recreation and religion. 
5 The economic goods category is defined as in the IMFs Finance Government Finance Statistics excluding road 
transport which is included in the public goods category. 
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infrastructure development, the nature of the bureaucracy and the quality of law enforcement 
explained a significant amount of variation in individuals' food security beyond an individual's 
and country's wealth endowments. The study was based on interviews with 25,397 respondents 
across 18 African countries (Sacks and Levi, 2010: 2332). Measures of civil bureaucracy6, law 
and order, and physical infrastructure, obtained from Afrobarometer survey data were used as 
independent variables. The dependent variable used in the study was based on whether an 
individual and his or her household members had enjoyed high levels of food security within the 
year preceding the survey7. 
 
The results show that living in a district where it was easy to obtain household services 
corresponded to an increase of 9 percentage points in the probability of enjoying high levels of 
food security (Sacks and Levi, 2010: 2340). Further, the probability of experiencing food 
security was 0.58 for individuals who lived in neighborhoods that lacked basic infrastructure 
while living in a district with infrastructure translated into a 0.67 probability that respondents and 
household members did not go hungry (Sacks and Levi, 2010: 2340). Sacks and Levi (2010: 
2345) noted that their findings were consistent with recent studies that had found strong 
correlations between the quality of government on one hand and economic and social outcomes 
on the other hand. 
 
In view of the above, the literature reviewed demonstrates that food security is positively 
associated with easy access to social services and the provision of infrastructure. Because the 
provision of social services and infrastructure is primarily the reserve of governments, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the effectiveness of governments in the 18 countries contributed to 
food security and to ameliorating living conditions. 
                                                             
6 Three items from the Afrobarometer were selected to capture the extent to which the bureaucracy has penetrated 
the country and the extent to which the bureaucracy is competent: (1. the ease or difficulty individuals face in 
getting identity documents (such as a birth certificate, voter card, passport or driver's license); (2. the availability of 
places in primary school for their children; (3. and access to household services (i.e., piped water or electricity)). 
7 Access to food is measured by answers to the question "Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your 
family gone without enough food to eat?" (Sacks and Levi, 2010: 2334). 
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2.4 Rule of Law and Socioeconomic Development 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators identify three areas that constitute governance. Of these, 
the third area of governance relates to the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that 
govern economic and social interactions among them (Kaufmann et al 2010). It is to this area of 
governance that the rule of law belongs. Going by this description, the rule of law can be viewed 
as being associated with both economic and social outcomes.  
 
2.4.1 Definitional and methodological debates on Rule of Law 
Interest in the rule of law as a possible solution to resolving political and economic problems 
around the world became commonplace in the early 1990s (Von Staden, 2009). Despite this, the 
term rule of law remains subject to different interpretations. Different conceptions have been 
provided about the rule of law, most of which converge around similar ideals. For example, 
Endicott (1999: 2) argues that the rule of law entails that: “laws must be open, clear, coherent, 
prospective, and stable; legislation and executive action should be governed by laws with those 
characteristics; and there must be courts that impose the rule of law”. This definition of the rule 
of law emphasizes the important role of courts to ensure that the different arms of government in 
a country are bound by clearly defined laws. In turn, the adherence of the different arms of 
government to the law serves to protect the social and economic interests of citizens such as the 
respect for private property rights and also leads to the control of corruption. 
  
In another definition, Hayek (cited by Boettke and Subrick, 2003: 112) argues that: “the rule of 
law means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand-
rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive 
powers in given circumstances and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this 
knowledge”. Hayek (cited by Boettke and Subrick, 2003: 113) further adds: “The rule of law is 
part of the intricate mix of institutions that enable individuals to realize the benefits of 
impersonal exchange and realize advanced economic development”. The view of the rule of law 
expressed by Hayek (cited by Boettke and Subrick, 2003) is consistent with liberal democratic 
tenets which focus on ensuring that democracy works to the benefit of individuals in society by 
providing a space for individuals to have their social, economic and political liberties protected 
by state institutions. This is opposed to autocratic forms of government in which the liberties of 
individuals are seldom respected. 
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The WGI define Rule of Law as “the extent to which individuals have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2010). This 
definition shows that like Endicott (1992) and Hayek (cited by Boettke and Subrick, 2003), the 
WGI are also influenced by liberal democratic tenets. This further indicates that the indicators 
that measure matters relating to governance converge around the idea that governance, whether 
political or otherwise, should lead to the protection of various liberties for individuals and that 
there should be institutions in place such as the police and the judiciary which should enforce the 
protection of liberties. In turn, the protection of liberties should provide an environment that 
allows improved socioeconomic outcomes. Based on this understanding of Rule of Law, it is also 
useful to engage with literature to establish the extent to which the rule of law is associated with 
socioeconomic development.  
 
The definitions highlighted above also show that most Rule of Law indicators are based on an 
understanding that countries run by autocratic governments are more strongly associated with 
low scores of Rule of Law while those run by governments along liberal democracy lines are 
more closely associated with high scores of Rule of Law. Contrary to this view, Mattei and 
Nader (cited by Von Staden, 2009: 362) argue that rather than being influenced by neoliberal 
ideals and multilateral institutions, Rule of Law indicators should reflect local law traditions 
regardless of whether these conform to international measures or not. In this way, assessments on 
the rule of law should be made on the basis of a country’s adherence to its own set of prescribed 
laws. 
 
2.4.2 Relationship between Measures of Rule of Law and Measures of Socioeconomic 
Development 
Boettke and Subrick (2003) carried out a quantitative study to examine the effects of the rule of 
law on the quality of life. The mathematical model that motivated their study was premised on 
the theory that GDP rises were associated with increased human capabilities and also that 
improvements in the rule of law were associated with economic development (Boettke and 
Subrick, 2003: 116). The study employed a strategy to use Rule of Law as an instrument for 
GDP (Boettke and Subrick, 2003: 116). In this way, Boettke and Subrick’s study (2003) 
investigated the impact Rule of Law had on economic development and in turn the impact that 
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economic development had on human well-being. This was based on the reasoning that the rule 
of law did not have a direct impact on human capabilities such as health outcomes and 
educational attainment which are largely the result of public policy (Boettke and Subrick, 2003: 
116). Boettke and Subrick (2003) therefore used an economic framework known as the 
instrumental variables approach to examine the extent to which the rule of law improved human 
well-being through its impact on economic development. 
 
The study first examined the impact of Rule of Law8 on four basic measures of well-being. 
These were Life Expectancy (male and female), Infant Mortality, Primary and Secondary 
Education, and Illiteracy (male and female) (Boettke and Subrick, 2003: 121). The results show 
that improvements in the rule of law led to improvements in the level of development that, in 
turn, led to increased life expectancy. These results were statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level (Boettke and Subrick, 2003: 121). The results also show that the rule of law had an indirect 
statistically significant effect on infant mortality. With regard to illiteracy, the coefficient on 
GDP was negative and significant at the 99 percent level. This was true for both females and 
males with improvements in female literacy being greater than the gains that males received 
from improvements in the rule of law (Boettke and Subrick, 2003: 121). The effects of economic 
development on illiteracy rates for both males and females show that the coefficients were 
negative in all regressions and statistically significant. According to Boettke and Subrick (2003: 
121) this indicates that improvements in income associated with the rule of law seem to increase 
the basic ingredients of human well-being. 
 
It is apparent from the study referred to above that the rule of law did not have a direct impact on 
human well-being. Nevertheless, it did have a positive impact on some factors that contribute to 
improvements in human well-being. 
 
Other studies have sought to establish the relationship between the rule of law and development 
by examining the differences between countries associated with respect for the rule of law and 
those with low Rule of Law ratings. In a quantitative study, Mahoney (2000) explored the impact 
                                                             
8 The study used Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Labton’s index of rule of law. The index measures the effectiveness 
of the judiciary and the extent to which the judiciary makes predictable decisions. It also measures the enforceability 
of contracts while also capturing the fairness and predictability of the legal framework (Boettke and Subrick, 2003: 
113). 
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of common law and of civil law on economic development. Based on Hayek’s analysis (1960; 
1967; 1973), Mahoney referred to common law as law that is more consistent with individual 
liberty and that is associated with fewer government restrictions on economic and other liberties 
(Mahoney, 2000: 3). Conversely, he referred to civil law as that associated with more 
interventionist governments (Mahoney, 2000: 3). In many respects, the distinction that Mahoney 
(2003) made was between countries that had embraced liberal democratic values of governance 
and those that had not. On the basis of these two distinct types of law, Mahoney explored the 
differences in the levels of economic development between countries he categorized as 
practicing common law and those he categorized as practicing civil law. 
 
Mahoney (2000: 27) found that over the period 1960 to 1992, common law countries 
experienced, on average, a bit more than half a percent greater real per capita GDP growth per 
year than did civil law countries, controlling for starting per capita GDP, secondary school 
enrollment, population growth, investment, and other factors. In this analysis, Mahoney (2000) 
tested the effects of common law using OLS regressions. The independent variable of interest 
was a dummy that took on the value 1 for common law countries and 0 for other countries 
(Mahoney, 2000: 18). Other independent variables used in the equation were the rate of 
enrollment in secondary education in 1960 which served as a proxy for investment in human 
capital, the average annual rate of population growth during the same period and the average 
investment share of GDP over the same period (Mahoney, 2000: 18).  
 
The dependent variable was the average annual rate of real per capita GDP growth. The results 
show that the coefficient on the common law dummy variable was both economically and 
statistically significant (Mahoney, 2000). Controlling for the other variables, the common law 
countries grew, on average, 0.64 percent per year faster than the civil law countries (p = .014) 
(Mahoney, 2000: 19). The results of the regressions further demonstrate that sub-Saharan Africa 
and Latin America were notably poor performers during the period of interest (Mahoney, 2000: 
21). Linking his findings to literature on the subject, Mahoney concluded that: “citizens of 
common law countries, controlling for the size of the economy, hold a greater portion of their 
wealth in forms whose value depends on the quality of contract enforcement…This suggests a 
higher level of confidence both that contracts will be enforced against private actors and that 
governmental actors will not interfere excessively in transactions or appropriate wealth” 
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(Mahoney, 2000: 25). The growth in real per capita GDP does not, however, reveal much about 
the level of inequality in a country. For this reason, it is necessary to note that real GDP per 
capita growth does not necessarily translate into improved well being for all citizens.  
 
Mahoney’s study illustrates that common law practicing countries were associated with a higher 
degree of respect for the rule of law than common law countries. This further indicates that 
countries with a liberal democratic approach to governance were more associated with improved 
socioeconomic development outcomes than less liberal or autocratic countries. Mahoney (2000) 
provides evidence that the quality of contract enforcement and the respect for the liberty of 
citizens in a country are generally accompanied by positive economic growth rates and higher 
standards of living. While the literature provides grounds to believe that the quality of the rule of 
law is a necessary condition for socioeconomic development caution needs to be taken to 
consider that the rule of law may not impact directly on human well-being but that it may only be 
positively correlated with other factors that have a direct influence on human well-being. For 
instance, a high Rule of Law score could also mean that institutions such as the police and the 
courts are executing their duties effectively, including addressing corruption. This would then 
lead to the abatement of distortions in government spending. 
 
2.5 Voice and Accountability and Socioeconomic Development  
This section discusses the association between measures of Voice and Accountability and 
measures of socioeconomic development. The discussion takes into account the debates 
regarding the concept “voice and accountability”, while also taking into account methodological 
issues related to the concept.  
 
2.5.1 Definitional and methodological debates on Voice and Accountability 
Unlike other measures concerning governance, the concept “voice and accountability” is 
arguably the most difficult to define. This is because the concept is derived from two terms, 
“voice” and “accountability”. Therefore, combining the two terms has the effect of presenting 
challenges in understanding the meaning of Voice and Accountability as a single concept 
because each of the two terms have separate meanings. 
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Kaufmann et al (2010) classify Voice and Accountability as a measure that falls under one of 
three broad themes of governance; the process by which governments are selected, monitored 
and replaced. It is in this context that Kaufmann et al (2010: 4) define Voice and Accountability 
as: “the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, 
as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media”. Like Rule of Law, 
the definition of Voice and Accountability appears to draw strongly from liberal democracy 
values which espouse universal suffrage, free and fair elections and democratic accountability by 
governments through the protection of liberties for citizens and the media. 
 
Without neglecting Kaufmann et al’s definition above, attention is also drawn to other 
conceptions of Voice and Accountability. Paul (1992) in a study on the impact of “voice” on 
public accountability of public services and governance in general, referred to “voice” as 
participation or protest used to induce service providers to perform. On the other hand, Paul 
(1992: 1048) referred to “accountability” as the degree to which individuals “can influence the 
final outcome of a service through some form of participation or articulation of protest or 
feedback”. Paul’s analysis indicates that the terms “voice” and “accountability” can be treated as 
separate but related terms which are both associated with the avenues through which citizens can 
hold governments accountable. To a large extent, Paul (1992) and Kaufmann et al (2010) define 
Voice and Accountability in a manner that can be identified with democracy and its attendant 
features. Related to this, Blair (2000: 17) states that in democratic governance, whether at 
national or local level, accountability refers to the extent to which public servants are held 
accountable. Again, this shows that Voice and Accountability refers to processes through which 
citizens can rein in their governments. Granted, this also means that through these processes, 
citizens can also hold governments accountable to the extent to which they handle matters 
relating to the improvement of human well-being. 
 
The Voice and Accountability indicator developed by Kaufmann et al is based on several 
measures compiled by different agencies and surveys. For example, the Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index (BTI) provides a measure of Voice and Accountability that is based on 
measuring political stability, stability of democratic institutions, and political and social 
integration (Kaufmann et al, 2010: 46). Other measures that contribute to Kaufmann et al’s 
measure of Voice and Accountability include indicators provided by Freedom House that 
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measure political rights, civil liberties, press freedom, as well as measures of the freeness of the 
media, civil society and electoral processes among others (Kaufmann et al, 2010). 
 
While some of the measures that contribute to Kaufmann et al’s indicator of Voice and 
Accountability focus primarily on freedoms of the media and citizens, others are targeted largely 
at capturing the integrity of democratic processes and institutions. An example of such a measure 
is the Gallup World Poll that captures confidence and honesty of elections (Kaufmann et al, 
2010: 55). Yet another example is the Latinobaromter survey that captures satisfaction with 
democracy and trust in parliament (Kaufmann et al: 61). 
 
The different measures highlighted above show that measures of Voice and Accountability 
include media and individual freedoms on the one hand, and satisfaction with democratic 
processes and institutions on the other hand. Because this study conceives of Voice and 
Accountability as a measure of the extent of democracy and satisfaction with democratic 
processes for reasons explained in Chapter 1 of this study, the literature reviewed focuses on the 
aforementioned conception of Voice and Accountability without necessarily taking into account 
media freedoms. 
 
2.5.2 Relationship between Measures of Voice and Accountability and Measures of 
Socioeconomic Development 
Bird et al (2008) used Worldwide Governance Indicators on Voice and Accountability and 
Control of Corruption to investigate the impact of governance on tax efforts in developing 
countries and high income countries. Bird et al’s study was predicated on the argument that 
developing countries need to spend more on public infrastructure, education and health services 
in order to be less poor, and increasing the tax revenue as a percentage to GDP is crucial to this 
task (Bird et al, 2008: 55). Also central to the argument was that developing countries did not tax 
themselves more because it was not in the interest of those who dominated political institutions 
of such countries to do so (Bird et al, 2008: 56). 
 
As part of their study, Bird et al (2008) tested the following hypothesis: “A more encompassing 
and legitimate state is an essential precondition for a more adequate tax system. If taxpayers 
perceive that their interests (preferences) are properly represented in political institutions having 
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a meaningful “voice” in influencing the state their willingness to contribute increases”. This 
hypothesis was probably motivated by liberal democracy that views the accountability of the 
state to citizens as an important feature of governance. In this study, Voice and Accountability 
and Control of Corruption were used as independent variables while the tax effort (tax revenue 
as a share of GDP) was used as a dependent variable in a regression analysis for a range of high 
income countries, with a similar regression test for developing countries for the period 1990 to 
1999 (Bird et al, 2008). 
 
The results show a strong positive correlation between Voice and Accountability and tax effort in 
high income countries, and a statistically significant negative correlation in developing countries. 
These results give support to the hypothesis that societies’ willingness to tax themselves depends 
on “good” government institutions (Bird et al, 008: 68). More importantly, the results also show 
that the extent to which governments are accountable to their citizens as well as the degree of 
legitimacy they enjoy, have an impact on their ability to justify taking economic decisions that 
ultimately lead to improved human well-being. It can also be argued that legitimacy and 
accountability are derived by the democratic processes through which governments are elected 
into office and the democratic means through which they account to their citizens. 
 
In a qualitative study that discusses the impact of democratic governance in resource rich African 
countries, Idemudia (2009) found that Nigeria was characterized by both poor democratic 
governance and declining levels of human development. This was in contrast to Botswana that 
had been associated with features of sound democratic governance such as democratic elections 
and rising levels of human development (Idemudia, 2009: 15). Despite this, Idemudia (2009) 
also established that democratic accountability did not in itself contribute to poverty reduction.  
Rather, democratic governance needed to be accompanied by the strengthening of the technical 
and institutional capacities of institutions of checks and balances, the diversification of civil 
society strategies, and an emphasis on macroeconomic policies (Idemudia, 2009: 3). 
 
It is evident from the foregoing that measures of Voice and Accountability, while associated with 
higher levels of socioeconomic development, cannot necessarily be viewed as being responsible 
for changes in socioeconomic development. Rather, it provides evidence that higher levels in 
measures of Voice and Accountability are likely to be associated with higher levels in measures 
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of socioeconomic development. This relationship could therefore be a result of the influence of 
Voice and Accountability on other matters relating to governance such as the effectiveness of 
governments. 
Following from the above argument, the possibility that Voice and Accountability may only 
impact on socioeconomic development indirectly is demonstrated in a study by Sakr (2003). In a 
qualitative study, Sakr (2003) found that Arab countries generally had high levels of human 
development and social well-being, despite most of them having low levels of democratic 
accountability. Sakr (2003:1) argued that this was possible for Arab states because state revenues 
were not derived from personal income tax, but from oil rents. As a result, Arab states were able 
to avoid establishing links with their citizens that require democratization and accountability 
(Sakr, 2003: 1). Sakr’s findings are profound for two reasons. First, they demonstrate that 
improved human well-being can be achieved even in the absence of Voice and Accountability. 
Second, they show that high levels of human development cannot necessarily be explained by 
high levels of Voice and Accountability, even though democratic accountability and human well-
being are closely associated with each other. 
 
It is evident from the literature reviewed that most measures related to governance were 
associated with changes in measures of socioeconomic development. The literature also 
demonstrates that in some cases, there is evidence that changes in measures related to 
governance led to changes in measures of socioeconomic development. This makes it possible to 
infer that governance reform could impact positively on development. However, in other cases, 
the literature shows that changes in measures related to governance were only associated with 
changes in socioeconomic development measures without causality being determined. 
Furthermore, changes in some measures related to development were found to impact on changes 
in measures relating to development indirectly. The literature therefore confirms the argument in 
the general debate of this section which suggests that the association between governance and 
development produces different results in different countries. 
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CHAPTER 3  
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
This chapter discusses the design, methods and indicators used in this study. It also explains the 
data sources used and the techniques employed to analyse data. The discussion that follows 
provides a framework for understanding the indicators and methods that were central to 
investigating whether indicators of matters relating to governance were associated with changes 
in measures of socioeconomic development in Zambia. 
 
3.1 General Design  
This research aimed to establish statistical relationships between indicators of matters concerning 
governance and measures of socioeconomic development in Zambia. A quantitative research 
design was used for this purpose because it provided the most appropriate means for analysing 
quantitative indicators of matters concerning governance and of socioeconomic development. A 
quantitative design was used instead of a qualitative research which would have been more 
appropriate for a study aimed at collecting data through qualitative interviews to investigate the 
perceptions amongst Zambians on the association between matters concerning governance and 
their living conditions. However, the logistics that would have been required to travel to Zambia 
to conduct interviews, particularly financial considerations meant that a qualitative research 
design would not have been feasible. In order to incorporate the views of Zambian citizens, this 
research took advantage of the fifth round Afrobarometer survey which provided data on 
citizens’ perceptions of governance and democracy in Zambia that could be analysed with the aid 
of statistical techniques. 
 
Access to Afrobarometer survey data was granted by the Afrobarometer office at the University 
of Cape Town (UCT). At the time access was granted, the data was not available to the public 
and was only made available for this study on request. My position as a student at UCT was a 
major consideration in being allowed access to the data which otherwise would not have been 
granted by the authorising office. 
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To address the extent to which matters concerning governance were associated with changes in 
socioeconomic development, this study first observed the trends in indicators of matters 
concerning governance at the country level. This was followed by observing the trends in HDI 
which was used as a proxy measure of Zambia’s socioeconomic development. The study then 
investigated the perceptions that Zambians had about matters concerning governance and about 
how they rated their present living conditions. Thereafter, correlation tests were run to determine 
how statistics related to matters concerning governance were associated with statistics measuring 
socioeconomic development in Zambia and between the perceptions that Zambians had about 
matters relating to governance and the incidence of lived poverty. This was done to understand 
how matters relating to governance were associated with socioeconomic development at the 
national level and at a personal level. 
 
For the purpose of addressing the association between statistics related to governance and 
statistics measuring socioeconomic development, the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators were chosen to provide data for statistics related to measures concerning governance 
in Zambia. The WGI were chosen because they provide six composite indicators of broad 
dimensions of governance covering over 200 countries since 1996. The WGI were also chosen 
because they were based on several hundred variables obtained from 31 different data sources, 
collecting governance perceptions reported by survey respondents, nongovernmental 
organizations, commercial business information providers, and public sector organizations 
worldwide (Kaufmann, et al, 2010). This meant that the WGI encompassed various dimensions 
of governance and thus, they were viewed to be more useful than measures concerning 
governance provided by a single data source. 
 
The six WGI indicators provide measures of Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, 
and Control of Corruption. For the purposes of this study, Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism and Regulatory Quality were not included only because the Afrobarometer 
survey, which was central to investigating citizens’ perceptions about matters concerning 
governance and living conditions, did not provide data that would have been useful for 
computing variables for the two measures. 
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This study used the Human Development Index as a measure of socioeconomic development in 
Zambia. The use of HDI was found appropriate because the index was arguably the most widely 
used measure of development that combined both social and economic factors of development. 
These aspects included measures of education, health and income. The study also included 
elements of a trends study by providing an analysis of the trends in the measures relating to 
governance and in HDI between 1996 and 2012. 
 
Afrobarometer data was useful for measuring perceptions of Zambian citizens on matters relating 
to governance and their living conditions. Specifically, this data was provided by the fifth round 
of Afrobarometer, conducted in 2012. The dataset contained question items that were used to 
compute variables for Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, and Voice 
and Accountability. The dataset also contained a set of questions that were used to compute a 
Lived Poverty Index that served as a measure of the citizens’ assessment of their own 
socioeconomic development. 
 
3.2 Indicators used in the Study 
This section discusses the indicators that were used in this study. This study relied on measures 
relating to governance provided by the WGI and the HDI as a measure for socioeconomic 
development in Zambia as well as Afrobarometer survey data to understand citizens’ perceptions 
about matters relating to governance and the incidence of lived poverty. However, the use of 
these data sources presented some concerns. This was particularly the case with WGI and HDI 
data. This section therefore engages critically with the indicators to understand how they are 
defined and measured, while taking their limitations into account. Taking this step also makes it 
possible to demonstrate the suitability of using these data sources in this study. 
 
3.2.1 Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Kaufmann et al (2009) defined governance as the “traditions and institutions by which authority 
in a country is exercised”. This includes the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored and replaced, the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement 
sound policies, and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic 
and social interactions among them (Kaufmann et al, 2009). 
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Kaufmann et al (2009) acknowledged that there are difficulties in measuring governance using 
any kind of data. To address this problem, they explicitly reported the margins of error 
accompanying each country estimate and found that after taking margins of error into account, 
the WGI permit meaningful cross country comparisons that are useful for monitoring progress in 
factors related to governance over time (Kaufmann et al, 2009). 
 
It is argued that the methodology employed for developing the indicators has three important 
strengths. First, the aggregation methodology makes the WGI more informative than any 
individual data source (Kaufmann et al, 2009). Second, it allows calculation of the margins of 
error of the estimated indicators (Kaufmann et al, 2009). The third advantage of the methodology 
is that it creates a data set that is global in coverage, albeit with some missing values (Kaufmann 
et al, 2009). 
 
In recent times, the WGI have emerged as a useful source of measuring the performance of 
countries with regard to matters relating to governance. The WGI have also become instrumental 
for allowing comparisons among countries on matters relating to governance and in some cases, 
they have also been used to inform policy. These factors coupled with the knowledge that the 
WGI are arguably the leading indicators on matters relating to governance motivated their use in 
this study to address the extent to which statistics related to governance in Zambia were 
associated with statistics measuring socioeconomic development. Nevertheless, this study took 
cognizance of the fact that the WGI had shortcomings. This also meant that the study had to take 
caution in the manner in which the WGI were used and reported. 
 
In discussing the shortcomings of the WGI, Thomas (2010) argues that the suitability of the 
indicators for shaping policy towards individual countries is questionable, given the large 
standard errors of the estimates. She finds that “of the 70 countries identified as potential MCA 
beneficiaries for the 2005 fiscal year, about 40 countries could be placed above or below the 
median with 90 per cent confidence; the remaining 30 fell into a “zone of uncertainty”” 
(Thomas, 2010: 34). 
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In addition to the standard errors, scholars and development practitioners have begun to raise 
other concerns about the indicators and their use.9 Particular attention has been given to the 
construct validity of the WGI. This relates to the fundamental question of whether the indicators 
measure what they claim to measure, or whether they even measure anything at all (Thomas, 
2010). For example, questions have been raised about whether the WGI measure perceptions of 
governance or governance itself. This question is of significant importance because “there is a 
substantial difference between measuring a thing and measuring perceptions of it. In the context 
of governance, for example, perceptions of crime risk have been shown to be quite different from 
actual crime levels;10  perceptions of corruption have been shown to differ from actual corruption 
levels;11 and trust in government has been shown to differ from administrative performance”12 
(Thomas, 2010: 36). It has also been noted that the WGI contain subjective perceptions of 
governance and yet the authors of the indicators continue to interpret changes in their data as 
reflecting changes in governance itself, rather than changes in perceptions of governance” 
(Thomas, 2010: 37). 
 
The argument made above presents an example of ways in which this study had to take caution 
in reporting changes in the WGI. This study recognized that the WGI were not presenting 
measures of governance in Zambia but rather of perceptions of matters that were related to 
governance. The study was therefore aware that the WGI could not be interpreted as actual 
measures of governance. Against this background, the use of the WGI was therefore motivated 
by the need to employ widely used measures of governance to understand the association 
between measures relating to governance and measures of socioeconomic development in 
Zambia.  
 
Another criticism of the WGI points to the fact that because the WGI are constructs that measure 
abstract ideas, evidence must be provided to show that the measures of the WGI were drawn 
from a theory (Thomas, 2010: 37) Thomas (2010) established that the WGI were neither defined 
nor rooted in theory and as such were not theoretically defensible. In response to this, Kaufmann 
                                                             
9 For example: Arndt and Oman, 2006; Knack, 2006; Kurtz and Shrank, 2006; Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2006; 
Kurtz and Shrank, 2007; Iqbal and Shah, 2008; 
10 see, for example, Forgas, 1980; Pfeiffer, 2005  
11 see, for example, Olken, 2006; Seligson, 2006 
12 Van de Walle and Bouckaert, 2007 
31 
 
et al (2010: 2) argued that “in the absence of universally accepted common definitions of the 
term governance and its related dimensions, it was reasonable to propose definitions of the six 
governance indicators that comprise the WGI provided they were based on existing definitions 
and understandings of the concepts”. 
 
Langbein and Knack (2008) also took issue with the WGI arguing that the six composite 
indicators appeared to be measuring the same broad concept. On the basis of this argument, 
Langbein and Knack (2008: 2) argued that there was no evidence of concept validity for the six 
indices13. Langbein and Knack (2008: 2) also criticized the WGI authors for not employing 
factor analysis or other means of exploring the dimensionality of the underlying data. Clearly, 
these criticisms show that the WGI are far from perfect but they also serve to highlight the 
challenges of measuring abstract concepts such as governance that do not have a universal 
definition or let alone a standard methodology for computing indicators. This meant that while 
the WGI were used in this study because of their increasing usage, the findings of this study had 
to take into account the fact that methodological issues relating to the indicators could also have 
had an influence on the results of the study. 
 
In addition to concept validity, the WGI have been criticized for lacking convergent and 
discriminant validity. Indicators satisfy convergent validity when they are correlated with things 
that theory says they are correlated with and satisfy discriminant validity when they are not 
correlated with things that theory says they should not be correlated with (Kaufman et al, 2010: 
2). Kaufmann et al (2010) addressed the concerns relating to construct validity and argued that 
construct validity was not a useful tool for assessing the merits of the WGI. They further 
contended that there was no evidence of any practical consequences of failure to meet the criteria 
of construct validity (Kaufmann et al, 2010). In response to arguments that the WGI lacked 
convergent and discriminant validity, the authors of the WGI noted that convergent and 
discriminant validity forced users to select empirical measures that were consistent with prior 
theorizing (Kaufmann et al 2010: 3). However, this was problematic because “it undermined the 
                                                             
13 Concept validity requires that: “an indicator of abstract A should be systematically related to concept A and not 
related to concept B. Similarly, the indicator of abstract concept B should be much more closely related to concept B 
than to concept A” (Langbein and Knack, 2008: 2). 
32 
 
primary purpose of data, which was to test theories to assess their empirical relevance” 
(Kaufmann et al 2010). 
 
In light of these debates, this study acknowledged the challenges associated with WGI measures 
while also recognizing that the WGI presented a composite index of measures relating to 
governance, collected from various sources. This was helpful for this study because it eliminated 
the problems that would inevitably have arisen in selecting indicators relating to governance 
from only one source. Relying on one source would have made it even more difficult to justify 
using a particular source for indicators as opposed to other sources. In addition, the focus of this 
study was not to inform policy making but rather to determine whether there was any empirical 
evidence to suggest the existence of an association between matters relating to governance and 
socioeconomic development in Zambia.  
   
3.2.2 Human Development Index 
The human development approach is closely related to the idea of human capabilities proposed 
by Sen (1985, 1999, 2009) and developed further by, among others, Nussbaum (2000, 2006) and 
Robeyns (2005) (Klugman et al, 2010: 6). The term “capabilities” is used to refer to: “the 
opportunities that a person has to exercise his or her freedom to attain different kinds of 
alternative lives between which a person can choose (Klugman et al, 2010: 7). The HDI centers 
on three: living a long and healthy life, having access to knowledge, and a decent standard of 
living to expand these freedoms (Klugman et al, 2010: 7). 
 
3.2.2.1 Indicators used in HDI 
It is necessary to engage with debates about the indicators used in HDI as this helps to 
understand whether the index is useful for providing a measure of human development. In the 
first HDR, “adult literacy and combined enrolment ratios were selected as indicators for the 
knowledge dimension, life expectancy at birth as the indicator for a healthy life and an adjusted 
GDP as the indicator for the standard of living” (Sagar and Najam, 1998). In more recent HDRs, 
the indicators for the three dimensions have been adjusted to improve the HDI’s measurement. 
Most notable among these changes are that Gross National Income (GNI) replaces GDP as the 
measure for living standards while mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling now 
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make up the education dimension (Klugman et al 2010: 15). However, Life expectancy remains 
the indicator for the health dimension. 
 
The motivation behind these changes is attributed to attempts to improve the computation and 
reliability of the HDI. The improvements were aimed at making the construction of indices for a 
large number of countries more feasible or to introduce new indicators to replace previous ones 
that had lost relevance as a result of “structural changes” (Klugman et al, 2010: 17). The 
replacement of the literacy measure by mean years of schooling is an example of a revision 
whose main purpose was to ensure current relevance because literacy had become deeply 
unsatisfactory over time as a measure of progress in education (Klugman et al 2010). Among the 
reasons for this change were that average literacy rates rose from 60 to 83 percent between 1970 
and 2010 and also because developed countries no longer collect data on basic literacy (Klugman 
et al, 2010). For these and a host of other reasons, the literacy rate was found to be increasingly 
less informative for future analyses on the quality of education in countries. 
 
Similarly GDP was replaced with GNI because it was recognized that the measure of income in 
the HDI is a proxy for the typical person’s command over resources that they can use to acquire 
goods and services, and save for the future (Klugman et al, 2010: 20). Based on this 
consideration GDP was excluded from HDI because it is a measure of how much an economy 
can produce as opposed to GNI which provides an indication of the extent to which citizens have 
a command over resources by taking into account transfers from abroad and excluding transfers 
to other countries (Klugman et al, 2010: 20). 
 
These changes give confidence that careful consideration has been given over the years to ensure 
that the HDI provides a measure that is useful for understanding the extent to which countries 
differ with regard to the expansion of human capabilities. While this is the case, the HDI remains 
subject to scrutiny because of methodological issues surrounding the computation of the index. 
Some of these concerns are highlighted in the next section. 
 
3.2.2.2 HDI Methodology 
For each dimension of HDI, the value of the index is computed on a scale of 0 to 1 where 0 
corresponds to the minimum, and 1 to the maximum assigned value for the corresponding 
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indicator (Sagar and Najam, 1998: 250). The overall HDI is then determined as the arithmetic 
average of the three indices (Sagar and Najam, 1998). However, Sagar and Najam (1998) 
questioned the decision for all three dimensions to be treated equally as it presupposes that the 
dimensions are equally essential in determining the level of human development. Sagar and 
Najam (1998; 252) instead proposed that the HDI should be computed as a product of the three 
component indices so that changes in the performance of any index would be reflected in the 
overall HDI. 
 
Another important methodological issue that Sagar and Najam (1998) raised is the capping of 
income in the HDI, a situation they found led to the transformation of over $30,000 in GNP to 
supposedly similar standard of living indices. This was observed in the 1997 HDR where 
Switzerland rated a 0.99 and Mexico 0.96 on the standard-of living index and yet the per capita 
GNP of Switzerland was more than nine times that of Mexico (Sagar and Najam, 1998). 
Klugman et al (2010) addressed this concern by stating that: “beyond a certain level of income, 
additional increments would not yield a significant increase in capabilities14”. 
 
Both concerns raised above confirm that HDI is an imperfect measure. The imperfection of HDI 
does not however negate the usefulness of the index as a measure of human development. This 
reasoning is informed by the understanding that most if not all measures of development suffer 
from methodological constraints and that the HDI probably more than other indices has 
consistently attempted to make improvements to its index. It also continues to provide a measure 
of both social and economic factors for close to 200 countries and territories based on a set of 
indicators and methods that permit comparisons among countries. It is for this reason that this 
study found HDI to be a reliable measure of social and economic factors of development. 
Despite arriving at this conclusion, this study was alive to debates regarding the credibility and 
reliability of HDI and addressed these debates in the section that follows. 
 
                                                             
14 In the 1990 HDR a cutoff level of income per capita was set to equal the official poverty line in nine industrial 
countries, an amount equal to $8,193 in 2008 dollars.  
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3.2.2.3 Credibility and Reliability of HDI 
It has been argued that a single composite measure is not sufficient to capture all aspects of 
human development and it has instead been suggested that it would be more appropriate to 
collect multiple indicators of the various dimensions of poverty including an index of command 
over market goods, indicators for health and education attainments and access to services 
(Ravallion, 2011: 2). 
 
Following the argument above, the UNDP HDRs have made attempts to address these concerns. 
Among measures taken, several other composite indices such as the Gender-related Development 
Index (GDI), Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) and Human Poverty Index (HPI) have been 
subsequently proposed by UNDP and the values of all these indices are annually estimated and 
given in HDRs (Klugman et al, 2010: 36). 
 
As much as the UNDP has made attempts to provide other indices to be used alongside the HDI, 
this study did not explore the possibility of using multiple indices to provide various dimensions 
of poverty and human well being. A major reason for this was attributable to the fact that the 
alternative indices composed by the UNDP are in their infancy. The implications of this are first, 
the indices have only been computed for a few years and their computation has not been done on 
an annual basis. This would have meant fewer data points for this study which would also have 
affected correlation results. Second, the indices undoubtedly suffer from a number of 
methodological concerns that have as yet not received the same amount of scrutiny as the HDI. 
Another important reason was that using multiple indices would have broadened this study 
considerably beyond the expected scope. 
 
Another major concern relating to the HDI has been raised relating to the data used in composing 
the index. Since the first publication of the HDR, subsequent reports have adjusted HDI values 
for preceding years in view of improved reporting of statistics. Tokuyama and Pillarisetti 
(2009:40) note that: “HDRs give revised estimates of the HDI values which they claim are more 
accurate for comparability”. As a result, the HDRs have adopted a system of reporting revised 
HDI values in succeeding HDRs. According to Tokuyama and Pillarisetti (2009: 40) “the 
estimates of the HDI are further revised and given with five year intervals which the HDRs claim 
are comparable across nations and time”. To illustrate this argument, the HDR 2002 gives the 
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HDI for the reference year 2000. Subsequently HDR 2004 gave new revised estimates for the 
HDI for 2000 and the HDR 2005 yet again gives further revised estimates for the HDI for 2000. 
The differences in HDI values for the same year have been found to vary from −10.16 per cent to 
10.62 per cent (Tokuyama and Pillarisetti, 2009:42). In spite of these shortcomings, it has been 
suggested that the UNDP should not be blamed for data revisions, as the data are perhaps the 
best available to UNDP from its sources (Tokuyama and Pillarisetti: 48). This demonstrates that 
data sources that provide measures on national development are highly susceptible to 
inaccuracies that could undermine the quality of data. This also means that caution has to be 
taken in the manner these statistics are interpreted and more importantly with the extent with 
which they are used to inform policy. For this reason this study took caution to ensure that the 
HDI values for Zambia used were based on the most recent revisions provided in the HDRs. 
 
Taking into account the many challenges that come with using HDI, this study recognizes that 
HDI remains the most widely used measure of development and a measure that provides 
arguably the best index of social and economic factors of development. Because this study could 
not dismiss the shortcomings of HDI, however convenient it was to use it, an attempt was made 
to remedy this concern by also investigating the extent of lived poverty in Zambia. This data was 
obtained from Round 5 of Afrobarometer and it served as an attempt to include an objective 
measure of social and economic aspects of development based on actual reports by Zambians. 
 
3.2.3 Afrobarometer Survey Data 
The Afrobarometer is an independent, non-partisan research project that measures the social, 
political, and economic atmosphere in Africa.15 Afrobarometer surveys are conducted in 35 
African countries and are repeated on a regular cycle.16 The research instrument used by 
Afrobarometer asks a standard set of questions in the 35 countries which makes it possible to 
make cross country comparisons and also to establish trends in public attitudes over time.17  
 
Questions from Afrobarometer survey data are incorporated into four of the WGI composite 
measures. The four measures are Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law 
                                                             
15 www.afrobarometer.org 
16 www.afrobarometer.org 
17 www.afrobarometer.org 
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and Voice and Accountability. Afrobarometer data is also useful for measuring living conditions 
in Africa. In this regard, Afrobarometer has developed an experiential measure of lived poverty 
(Mattes, 2008). The Lived Poverty Index (LPI) is based on a series of five questions that assess 
how frequently people go without basic necessities: enough food to eat, clean water, medicines 
or medical treatment, cooking fuel and a cash income (Afrobarometer, 2009). 
 
According to Mattes (2008), the LPI measure “has strong individual level construct validity and 
reliability within and across national round of surveys”. The LPI measure is also useful for 
capturing a portion of the central core of the concept of poverty not captured by existing 
objective or subjective measures (Mattes, 2008: 1). However, the LPI also exhibits “inconsistent 
levels of external validity as a measure of aggregate level poverty when compared to other 
objective measures of poverty or well-being” (Mattes, 2008: 1). Despite this, Afrobarometer’s 
lived poverty is very strongly related to country level measures of political freedom (Mattes, 
2008). Afrobarometer also provides data on popular attitudes towards various aspects of human 
well-being, including towards matters relating to governance.  
 
In an attempt to ensure that the data collected is credible and fit for use by policymakers, 
Afrobarometer’s fifth round Zambian survey undertook to collect data from 1,200 respondents, a 
representative sample of the population, based on scientific sampling methods. The sample was 
drawn by taking the smallest geographic units, census Enumeration Areas (EAs), and stratifying 
all EAs across the country into separate lists according to provinces and wards and type of 
geographical area (urban/rural) (Afrobarometer, 2013). A total of 150 EAs were then randomly 
selected from the lists with the probability proportionate to its size in the overall population as 
represented in the 2010 census of population and housing (Afrobaromter, 2013). According to 
Afrobarometer, this ensured that every eligible adult had an equal and known chance of being 
selected (Afrobarometer, 2013: 1). Thereafter, eight households were randomly selected within 
each EA, and a respondent 18 years of age or older was randomly selected from each household 
(Afrobarometer, 2013). A gender quota ensured that every other interview was with a female 
respondent (Afrobarometer, 2013). A sample of this size was sufficient to yield an overall 
margin of error of 3 percent at a confidence level of 95 percent (Afrobarometer, 2013). 
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The use of Afrobarometer survey was therefore justified on the basis of the scientific methods 
used in the sampling, the representativeness of the sample, and the fact that the data provided the 
most convenient means of establishing perceptions about matters relating to governance and 
living conditions in Zambia. 
 
3.3 Methods 
This section provides an overview of the methods that were used to investigate whether measures 
of matters concerning governance were associated with measures of socioeconomic development 
in Zambia. The section provides a discussion of the steps taken and the techniques of analysis 
that were employed. 
 
3.3.1 Computation of Variables 
An important part of this study was to compute variables for measures relating to governance 
from the Afrobarometer survey using SPSS. Before computing the variables, the question items 
that were selected for this process were checked for missing data. Afterwards, a factor analysis 
was run for each of the variables18. The factor loadings were used to compute variables for 
Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, and Lived Poverty using the 
maximum likelihood extraction method and direct oblimin rotation. The Voice and 
Accountability variable was computed after running a factor analysis with the unweighted least 
squares method and direct oblimin rotation. The maximum likelihood and generalized least 
squares methods were not suitable for computing a variable for Voice and Accountability 
because the degrees of freedom did not permit. Furthermore, reliability analysis was run on each 
of the question items to establish the consistency of the subscales in the questionnaire. 
 
The four variables relating to governance were based on question items that the WGI relied on as 
part of their composite measures. The question items did not directly ask about governance, but 
rather, they were useful for computing variables for the four measures relating to governance in 
this study. For example, the question items that were used to compute a variable for Control of 
Corruption were based on perceptions about the levels of corruption among seven government 
officials and public institutions. For Government Effectiveness, the question items were based on 
                                                             
18 Exploratory factor analysis is used in the social sciences to measure things that cannot be directly measured (so 
called latent variables)-see Field, 2009. 
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perceptions of the government’s handling of matters relating to fifteen different tasks. With 
regard to Rule of Law, the question items were based on the level of trust that citizens had in 
nine different institutions that were central to upholding the rule of law. And lastly, the question 
items for Voice and Accountability were based on questions that asked about perceptions of the 
extent of democracy in Zambia, the satisfaction with democracy in Zambia, and the satisfaction 
with the last general elections held in Zambia. 
 
3.4 Analysis    
This study used quantitative techniques to understand the relationship between measures relating 
to governance and measures relating to socioeconomic development. This study obtained data on 
four measures relating to governance from the World Bank’s online data bank. The data bank 
provided time series data for Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, 
and Voice and Accountability for the period 1996 to 2012. Similarly, data on HDI, which was 
used as a measure for the level of socioeconomic development in Zambia, was sourced from 
various Zambia Human Development Reports published between 1999 and 2013. 
 
The WGI and HDI data were then entered into Microsoft Excel sheets and later imported into 
SPSS. Importing the data into SPSS was useful for running correlation tests between WGI data 
and HDI for the period 1996 to 2012. However, in order to understand the changes in indicators 
of matters relating to governance over time in Zambia, this study made use of a facility on the 
World Bank’s online data bank that produced charts based on the time series data provided by 
the data bank. This made it possible to obtain a chart that showed the changes in the scores of the 
four indicators relating to Zambia’s governance between 1996 and 2012. The chart was then 
imported to MS Word. Also, to understand the changes in Zambia’s HDI between 1996 and 
2012, this study used Microsoft Excel to produce a line graph based on data from the ZHDRs 
that had been entered into an Excel sheet. 
 
Correlation tests between the WGI measures and HDI were run using the pairwise deletion of 
missing data method. This decision was necessitated by missing data points on the WGI and HDI 
data sets. WGI data for the years 1997, 1999 and 2001 was unavailable while HDI data for the 
years 1996, 2006 and 2008 was also unavailable. According to De Vaus (2002: 176), when using 
pairwise deletion to calculate the correlation between any two variables, all cases that have non-
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missing values for those two variables are used to calculate the correlation even if those cases 
have missing values on other variables being used in the analysis. It was also necessary to use a 
deletion method because there were a different number of cases for the WGI and HDI variables. 
The pairwise approach proved to be useful in this regard because it gives a correlation matrix in 
which each coefficient may be based on a different number of cases (De Vaus, 2002: 176).The 
disadvantage of the pairwise approach is that it leads to some loss of cases but this is not nearly 
as marked as with other deletion methods (De Vaus, 2002: 176). This, however, was not viewed 
to be a major problem given the small number of missing data points. 
 
Correlation tests were also run between the measures relating to governance computed from 
Afrobarometer data and the Lived Poverty Index. Each correlation test produced a Pearson 
correlation coefficient (r) which was useful for determining the direction of the relationship 
between the measures relating to governance and those relating to socioeconomic development. 
While the Pearson r was also useful for determining how strong the relationships were, it could 
not be used to determine the direction of causality between measures relating to governance and 
measures relating to socioeconomic development. 
 
However, calculating the covariance (R2) makes it possible to determine how much variation in 
one variable is directly related to (or accounted for by) the variation in the other variable (Field, 
2009). In both correlation tests, the Pearson r values were squared to find the covariance (R2). 
Based on the value of R2, the covariance was used to get an idea about how accurate any 
predictions made about one variable could be made from knowledge of the other variable (Field, 
2009). While the covariance cannot be used to infer causal relationships, R2 can be used as an 
extremely effective measure of the substantive importance of effect (Field, 2009). In this regard, 
larger correlation coefficients mean stronger relationships which give rise to higher R2 values 
(Field, 2009). Higher R2 values mean more variance accounted for and allow better, more 
accurate predictions about one variable based on knowledge of the other (Field, 2009). 
 
In summary, this study used a quantitative research design to investigate whether measures 
relating to governance were associated with changes in measures related to socioeconomic 
development. The indicators used in the study obtained from World Bank, UNDP and 
Afrobarometer, proved to be among the most widely used and most easily accessible. The World 
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Bank and UNDP provided indicators of measures relating to governance and socioeconomic 
development respectively for the period 1996 to 2012. These sources were also found to be very 
convenient for time series data. As indicated earlier in this chapter, Afrobarometer data was the 
most convenient and reliable avenue to investigate the perceptions of Zambian citizens towards 
matters relating to governance and to find out the extent of lived poverty. Though the statistical 
tests could not be used to determine if the measures relating to governance were responsible for 
the changes in measures relating to socioeconomic development, the correlation and covariance 
coefficients were useful for determining the degree of association between the measures as well 
as the amount of shared variance which could be used for predictions about changes in one 
measure based on knowledge of the other. 
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CHAPTER 4  
RESULTS 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate whether indicators of measures concerning 
governance were associated with measures of socioeconomic development in Zambia. This 
chapter proceeds by first mapping out the performance of indicators of measures relating to 
governance in Zambia during the period 1996 to 2012 and then addresses the changes in HDI 
during the same period. It then turns to report the perceptions that Zambian citizens have about 
governance in their country and how they rate their living conditions. The chapter concludes by 
showing the correlations between factors related to governance and HDI, and between the 
perceptions of citizens about matters relating to governance and their present living conditions. 
 
4.1 Performance of Governance Indicators in Zambia 
This section shows the findings of changes in indicators of Zambia’s governance between 1996 
and 2012 based on the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. The WGI measures 
concerning governance are scaled from -2.5, which represents the lowest level on each measure, 
to 2.5 representing the highest level. Scores between -2.5 and 0 are associated with poor 
governance, while scores above 0 are associated with good governance. 
 
Figure 1 below shows that in 1996, Zambia scored -0.4 on the WGI measure of Voice and 
Accountability, -0.6 on Rule of Law, -1 on Control of Corruption and -1.1 on Government 
Effectiveness. It is clear that Zambia scored poorly on all four indicators concerning governance 
in 1996. The results further highlight that Zambia scored the highest on its measure of Voice and 
Accountability and the lowest on its measure of Government Effectiveness at the start of the 
observations in 1996 as well as at the end in 2012. Between 1996 and 1998, there was a 
reduction in the measure of Voice and Accountability from -0.4 to -0.6, while the other three 
measures recorded positive changes. After 1998, the Voice and Accountability measure 
continued on an upward trend, peaking at -0.2 in 2006, where it remained until 2008. Though 
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there was a slight decline in the measure of Voice and Accountability between 2009 and 2010, 
the measure returned to its peak levels in 2011 and remained at -0.2 in 2012. 
 
Figure 1 Performance of Zambia’s governance indictors from 1996 to 2012 
 
Source: World Bank Data Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators [Online]  
 
Figure 1 demonstrates similar trends for the other measures. The measure for Rule of Law 
peaked at -0.4 in 2002 and though it declined in the succeeding years, it eventually returned to its 
-0.4 peak level in 2008, a score it returned to in 2012, after suffering another decline in the 
intervening period. With regard to the measure for Control of Corruption, Figure 1 above shows 
that the score continuously improved from 1996, though it declined slightly from -0.7 to -0.8 
between 2004 and 2005. The measure for Control of Corruption improved further, eventually 
peaking at -0.4 in 2012, despite having dipped to -0.6 in 2010. With respect to the measure for 
Government Effectiveness, there was an upward trend from 1996 that was interrupted by a slight 
decline from -0.8 to -0.9 between 2004 and 2005. Thereafter, the evidence shows an upward turn 
in the measure for Government Effectiveness that, despite taking a dip between 2008 and 2010, 
eventually peaked at -0.5 in 2012. 
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Figure 1 above shows that between 1996 and 2012, gains were made on the four indicators 
concerning governance. And yet, the scores on all four indicators show that in 2012 Zambia was 
still associated with poor governance. 
 
4.2 Trends in Zambia’s HDI    
This study used HDI as a measure of socioeconomic development. In this section, the study 
shows the changes in Zambia’s HDI between 1996 and 2012. Based on HDI data collected from 
the UNDP for the period under consideration, Figure 2 below provides a graphical representation 
of the changes in Zambia’s socioeconomic development. 
 
Figure 2 Trends in Zambia’s HDI between 1996 and 2012 
 
Sources of Data: UNDP, 1999-2013, Zambia Human Development Reports 
 
Data for Zambia’s 1996 HDI were not available from the UNDP. However, Figure 2 shows that 
in 1998, Zambia had an HDI value of 0.42, placing it in the UNDP’s low human development 
category. Figure 2 also shows that Zambia’s HDI dropped to 0.367 in 2000. This dip was most 
likely due to the impact of HIV/AIDS as the discussion in the next chapter demonstrates.  
Thereafter, there was a gradual and steady increase in the HDI value that rose to 0.389 in 2002, 
0.394 in 2003 and 0.407 in 2004. In 2005, there was a decline in HDI to 0.399. However, after 
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2005 the HDI value increased every year reaching 0.411 in 2007 before rising further to 0.419 in 
2009. Figure 2 shows that there were additional gains in HDI with a value of 0.438 recorded in 
2010, followed by rises to 0.443 in 2011 and subsequently 0.448 in 2012.  Figure 2 also shows 
that from 2000, the levels of human development in Zambia were lower than the 1998 levels. In 
fact, it was not until 2011 that Zambia returned to levels of human development similar to those 
recorded in 1998. While Zambia’s HDI value in 2012 was marginally higher than its 1998 value, 
Figure 2 shows that Zambia remained a low human development country. 
 
4.3 Perceptions of Governance in Zambia 
This section presents the results of the perceptions that Zambian citizens have about matters 
relating to governance in Zambia. The findings present the perceptions about: the number of 
officials in key state institutions involved in corruption, the extent to which the government is 
handling important social and economic matters, the extent to which they trust institutions 
responsible for enforcing the law, and their satisfaction with democracy and electoral processes.  
   
4.3.1 Perceptions of Corruption in Zambia 
The summary provided in Table 1 below shows the percentage of Zambians that think there is 
corruption in key state institutions. The results display responses to the question: “How many of 
the following people do you think are involved in corruption?” Table 1 shows the percentage of 
respondents that indicated none, some of them, most of them or all of them, in response to the 
number of people they believed were involved in corruption in each of the institutions 
mentioned. 
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Table 1 Perceptions of Corruption in Zambia 
 Number of officials involved in corruption (%) 
None Some of them Most of them All of them 
Office of the 
President 
17.7 58.1 12.2 5.5 
Members of 
Parliament 
11.1 59.8 18.8 5.3 
Government 
Officials 
8.1 60.1 22.4 5.3 
Local 
Government 
Councillors 
11.3 56.6 22.1 5.8 
Police 6.4 43.6 34.8 11.4 
Tax Officials 9.5 53.3 17.8 5 
Judges and 
Magistrates 
12.3 55.9 17.2 4.3 
 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 5 Survey 
 
From Table 1, it is clear that the office of the President is perceived to be the least corrupt of the 
institutions in question, as demonstrated by close to 18 per cent of the respondents who believed 
that none of the officials in this office were involved in corruption. On the contrary, the Police 
Force was perceived to be the most corrupt institution as highlighted by the results that show that 
only 6.4 per cent of the respondents believe that no one in the police was involved in corruption. 
Table 1 also shows that Zambian citizens had very high perceptions about the existence of 
corruption. On the basis of perceptions that some, most or all officials were involved in 
corruption, the results show that 75.8 per cent of the respondents believed there was corruption 
in the office of the President. The results also show that the perceptions of corruption stood at 
83.9 per cent for Members of Parliament, 87.8 per cent for government officials, 84.5 per cent 
for local government councillors, 89.8 per cent for the police, 76.1 per cent for tax officials, and 
77.4 per cent for judges and magistrates. Again, the results show that the police were viewed as 
the most corrupt, closely followed by government officials, while the office of the President, tax 
officials, and judges and magistrates were viewed as the least corrupt in that order. 
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4.3.2 Perceptions of Government Effectiveness in Zambia 
This section presents the findings of the perceptions Zambians have about the effectiveness of 
the government. Table 2 provides a summary of responses to the question: “How well or badly 
would you say the current government is handling the following matters?” Table 2 presents the 
number of respondents, expressed as percentages that indicated very badly, fairly badly, fairly 
well, and very well to each matter.  
 
Table 2  Perceptions of the effectiveness of the Zambian Government 
 How the government is handling matters (%) 
Very Badly Fairly Badly Fairly Well Very Well 
Managing economy 9.6 24.8 51.7 10.6 
Improving living standards of poor 24.5 30.3 37.5 5.9 
Creating jobs 32.3 32.9 27.3 4.7 
Keeping prices down 29.4 35.3 27.8 5.6 
Narrowing income gap 32.3 33.9 24.7 3.9 
Reducing crime 16.1 28.3 43.6 8.9 
Improving basic health services 14.5 25.3 50.1 9.1 
Addressing educational needs 15.8 23.2 50.3 9.5 
Improving water and sanitation 
services 
31.6 26.1 33 6.6 
Ensuring enough to eat 32.4 31.7 29.8 3.9 
Fighting corruption 16.9 24.6 39.5 10.9 
Resolving violent conflict between 
communities 
6.8 18.3 47.1 11.8 
Maintaining roads and bridges 26.8 22.4 36.1 13.7 
Providing reliable electric supply 33.1 25.2 30.3 8.3 
Empowering women 17.3 18.7 41.3 14 
 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 5 Survey 
 
Table 2 shows that the matter the government was found to have handled very well was 
empowering women. 14 per cent of respondents indicated that the government had done very 
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well in handling women empowerment. This was followed by 13.7 per cent who indicated that 
the government had handled the maintenance of roads and bridges very well, while 11.8 per cent 
of respondents believed the government had done very well in resolving violent conflict between 
communities. 
 
Conversely, Table 2 shows that about a third, or 33 per cent, indicated that the government had 
done very badly in providing reliable electric supply. On the basis of the evidence in Table 2, the 
government was also found to have done very badly in ensuring enough to eat for Zambians 
(32.4 per cent). Further, the government was perceived to have done very badly in creating jobs 
(32.3 per cent) and narrowing income gaps (32.3 per cent), while 31.6 per cent indicated that the 
government had done very badly in improving water and sanitation services. 
 
From Table 2, it was also possible to classify the performance of the Zambian government in 
handling specific matters as either ‘badly’ or ‘well’. This was done by adding the percentage of 
Zambians who believed the government had done very badly and fairly badly on one hand, and 
those that felt the government had done fairly well or very well on the other. These results show 
that the top five areas that the government was perceived to have handled well were: managing 
the economy (62.3 per cent), addressing educational needs (59.8 per cent), improving basic 
health services (59.2 per cent), resolving violent conflict between communities (58.9 per cent), 
and reducing crime (52.5 per cent). 
 
On the other hand, the five areas that the government was perceived to have handled worst were: 
narrowing income gaps (66.2 per cent), creating jobs (65.2 per cent), keeping prices down (64.7 
per cent), ensuring enough to eat (64.1 per cent) and providing reliable electric supply (58.3 per 
cent). 
 
The results further show that more than half the population believed the government had handled 
seven of the matters well. Similarly, more than half the population indicated that the government 
had handled another seven matters badly. It is also worth noting that the matters the government 
was perceived to have handled well mostly related to areas closely associated with the macro 
economy while those they were perceived to have handled badly were more closely associated 
with challenges at the household level. 
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4.3.3 Perceptions of Rule of Law in Zambia  
Table 3 highlights the extent to which Zambians trust the institutions and officials entrusted with 
upholding the law. The summary presented shows the number of respondents, expressed as 
percentages, to the question: “How much do you trust each of the following?” The responses 
ranged from not at all to just a little, somewhat, and a lot. 
 
Table 3 Trust in Rule of Law institutions 
 Level of trust (%) 
Not at all Just a little Somewhat A lot 
President 9.8 23.3 22.8 42.7 
Parliament/National Assembly 15.1 29.2 24.8 28.7 
National Electoral 
Commission 
12 27 22.2 33.4 
Tax Department 13.6 29.3 20.9 23.7 
Local Government Council 22.6 33.3 21.7 20 
Ruling Party 12 29 26.2 30.8 
Police 21.8 29 21.5 27.3 
Army 8 16.7 23.9 50.4 
Courts of Law 10 24.1 23.9 38.1 
 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 5 Survey 
 
Table 3 demonstrates that there was a relatively high degree of trust in most of the institutions 
charged with upholding the rule of law in Zambia. For example, 72.2 per cent of the respondents 
indicated that they trusted the Army somewhat or a lot. About two thirds, 65.5 per cent, trusted 
the President somewhat or a lot. Table 3 also shows that only the Police (48.8 per cent), the Tax 
Department (44.6 per cent) and the Local Government Council (41.6 per cent) were trusted 
somewhat or a lot by less than half of all respondents. 
 
The evidence in Table 3 further highlights that the Local Government Council were the least 
trusted, with a total of 55.9 per cent of the respondents indicating that they trusted them not at all 
or just a little. On the contrary the Army were the most trusted. By and large, the results indicate 
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that more than half of all Zambians trusted six of the nine institutions somewhat or a lot. This 
also demonstrates that more than half of all Zambians trusted most of the institutions that are 
central to upholding the rule of law. 
 
4.3.4 Perceptions of Voice and Accountability in Zambia 
This section presents the findings of the perceptions that Zambian citizens have toward 
democratic accountability with specific regard to the extent of democracy, satisfaction with 
democracy, and the freeness and fairness of the last election of 20 September 2011. 
  
Table 4 Perceptions of Voice and Accountability in Zambia 
 Satisfaction 
with 
democracy 
(%) 
 Freeness and 
fairness of 
the last 
election (%) 
 
 Extent of 
democracy 
(%) 
Not at all 
satisfied 
5.4 Not free and 
fair 
 
5.3 Not a 
democracy 
2.3 
Not very 
satisfied 
25 Free and fair 
with major 
problems 
 
6.5 A democracy 
with major 
problems 
20.3 
Fairly 
satisfied 
45.1 Free and fair 
with minor 
problems 
23.1 A democracy, 
but with 
minor 
problems 
 
48.6 
Very satisfied 22.8 Completely 
free and fair 
62.4 A full 
democracy 
 
27.3 
 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 5 Survey 
 
Table 4 shows that most Zambians have confidence in democracy and democratic processes. The 
results show that only 2.3 per cent did not believe Zambia was a democracy. Table 4 also shows 
that 48.6 per cent stated that Zambia was a democracy, albeit with minor problems, while 27.3 
per cent stated that it was a full democracy. Similarly, up to as many as 67.9 per cent of the 
population were either fairly satisfied or very satisfied with democracy in Zambia. The findings 
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presented in Table 4 also highlight that 23.1 per cent of the respondents indicated that the last 
general elections held in September 2011 were free and fair with minor problems while 62.4 per 
cent indicated that the elections were completely fair. This shows that an overwhelming 85.5 per 
cent of respondents were satisfied with the electoral process in Zambia. 
 
In order to provide a clearer representation for the results of perceptions of Zambian citizens 
about Voice and Accountability, Figure 3 provides a graphical display of the results in Table 4.  
 
Figure 3 Perceptions of Voice and Accountability in Zambia 
 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 5 Survey 
 
4.4 Lived Poverty in Zambia 
This section reports the findings of the extent of lived poverty amongst Zambian citizens. Table 
5 below shows the percentage of respondents who indicated that they had gone without basic 
necessities never, just once or twice, several times, many times or always in the 12 months 
preceding the survey. The basic necessities referred to are: enough food to eat, clean water, 
medical care, cooking fuel and cash income.  
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Table 5 Rating of Present Living Conditions in Zambia 
 
 Number of times went without access to basic necessity (%) 
Never Just once or 
twice 
Several 
times 
Many times Always 
Food 51.6 21.4 16.9 9.4 0.6 
Water 45.9 11.7 17.9 14.9 9.7 
Medical Care  42.1 14.9 21.3 17.5 3.8 
Cooking Fuel 60.7 16.2 14.1 6.7 2 
Cash Income 18.3 14.2 25.3 33.5 8.4 
 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 5 Survey 
 
Table 5 shows that more than half the population, or close to 52 per cent, had consistent access to 
food. The results also show that just over 48 per cent of the population experienced some kind of 
food insecurity. A slightly smaller proportion of the population, about 46 per cent, had access to 
water during the entire period under consideration. However, around 54 per cent reported having 
gone without water at some point, with close to 10 per cent of the population having gone 
without water the whole time.  
 
With regard to medical care, the results show that just over 42 per cent had access to medical 
care throughout the year preceding the survey. On the other hand, close to 58 per cent had been 
affected by a lack of access to medical care. Table 5 also shows that close to 61 per cent of 
respondents were not afflicted by a lack of access to cooking fuel. Despite this, at least 39 per 
cent of the population had been afflicted by lack of access to cooking fuel. Further, Table 5 
shows that only 18 per cent of the population reported having access to cash income throughout 
the year preceding the survey. On the contrary, up to as many as 81 per cent of the population 
had been affected by lack of access to cash income, with as many as eight per cent having gone 
without cash income the whole time. 
 
From Table 5, it is evident that more than half the population had uninterrupted access to food 
and cooking fuel. With regard to severity measured by the proportion of the population that went 
without essential necessities several times, many times or all the time, Table 5 shows that more 
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than two thirds of the population, or 67 per cent, were severely affected by lack of cash income. 
The lack of access to cash income was more severe than access to cooking fuel and food, whose 
severity stood at 22.8 per cent and 26.9 per cent respectively, while the severity of lack of access 
to water and medical care stood at just over 42 per cent for both items. 
 
4.5 Association between WGI and HDI 
This section presents the findings of the correlations between HDI and the WGI measures that 
concern governance. The evidence shows a strong positive correlation between HDI and Control 
of Corruption, Government Effectiveness and Voice and Accountability. Table 6 also shows that 
the results of the correlation between HDI and Rule of Law were statistically non-significant.   
 
Table 6 Correlations between WGI and HDI 
 Correlations with HDI 
N Pearson correlation 
R 
R2 Covariation      
(%) 
Test of 
Significance 
Control of 
Corruption 
11 .792** .627 62.7 .004 
Government 
Effectiveness 
11 .652* .425 42.5 .030 
Rule of Law 11 .281 .079 7.9 .402 
Voice and 
Accountability 
11 .625* .391 39.1 .040 
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)       ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level  
 
4.5.1 Control of corruption and HDI 
Table 6 shows that the correlation coefficient for Control of Corruption and HDI was 0.792. This 
result signified a strong positive correlation. Further, it indicated that increases in Control of 
Corruption were accompanied by increases in HDI. The correlation was significant at the 0.01 
level and the result could not be attributed to a chance occurrence. By calculating the shared 
variance between Control of Corruption and HDI, Table 6 shows that 62.7 per cent of the 
variation in Control of Corruption was shared with HDI.  Therefore, 62.7 per cent of the changes 
in HDI could be attributed to changes in Control of Corruption. 
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4.5.2 Government Effectiveness and HDI 
The results in Table 6 show that the correlation coefficient for Government Effectiveness and 
HDI was 0.652. This result signified a strong positive correlation and shows that increases in 
Government Effectiveness were accompanied by increases in HDI. The correlation was 
significant at the 0.05 level and the result could not be attributed to a chance occurrence. By 
calculating the shared variance it was found that 42.5 per cent of the variation in Government 
Effectiveness was shared with HDI. This suggests that 42.5 per cent of the changes in HDI could 
be explained by changes in Government Effectiveness. 
 
4.5.3 Rule of Law and HDI 
The correlation coefficient for Rule of Law and HDI was 0.281 as shown in Table 6. The 
evidence indicates that there was a positive correlation between Rule of Law and HDI. This 
demonstrates that increases in Rule of Law were accompanied by increases in HDI. This study 
also sought to establish the variance shared between Rule of Law and HDI. In this respect, Table 
6 shows that 7.9 per cent of the variation in Rule of Law was shared with HDI. However, this 
result was statistically non-significant. Therefore, this result could be attributed to a chance 
occurrence. On this basis, changes in HDI could not be attributed to changes in Rule of Law. 
 
4.5.4 Voice and Accountability and HDI 
This study further set out to establish the association between Voice and Accountability and 
HDI. The results of this correlation analysis are presented in Table 6. The correlation coefficient 
for Voice and Accountability and HDI was 0.625. This result showed that there was a strong 
positive correlation between Voice and Accountability and HDI. Therefore, the evidence shows 
that increases in Voice and Accountability were accompanied by increases in HDI. The 
correlation was significant at the 0.05 level and the result could not be attributed to a chance 
occurrence. By calculating the covariance between Voice and Accountability and HDI, it was 
found that 39.1 per cent of the variation in Voice and Accountability was shared with HDI. 
Therefore 39.1 per cent of the changes in HDI could be explained by changes in Voice and 
Accountability. 
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4.6 Association between Perceptions of Governance and Lived Poverty 
This section presents the findings of the association between the perceptions that Zambians had 
about aspects concerning governance and their living conditions. The evidence is presented in 
Table 7 and it shows a negative correlation between living conditions and Government 
Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Voice and Accountability. While the correlation between Lived 
Poverty and Control of Corruption is positive, the evidence shows that the results are statistically 
non-significant. 
 
Table 7 Correlations between Perceptions of Governance and Living Conditions 
 Correlations with Lived Poverty 
N Pearson correlation 
R 
R2 Covariation      
(%) 
Test of 
Significance 
Control of 
Corruption 
958 .063 .0397 3.97 .053 
Government 
Effectiveness 
837 -.312** .097 9.7 .000 
Rule of Law 979 -.093** .086 8.6 .004 
Voice and 
Accountability 
1138 -.100** .001 0.1 .001 
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)       ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level  
 
4.6.1 Perceptions of Corruption and Lived Poverty 
The results in Table 7 show that the correlation coefficient for Control of Corruption and Lived 
Poverty was 0.063. The correlation coefficient was positive, suggesting that lower scores on the 
corruption perception index, which correspond to low perceptions of corruption, were associated 
with low values on the Lived Poverty Index which signified low scores of lived poverty. 
Furthermore, the results show that the shared variance between perceptions of corruption and 
lived poverty was 3.97 per cent. However, the evidence in Table 7 shows that the results were 
statistically non-significant. This demonstrates that the results could be attributed to a chance 
occurrence. 
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4.6.2 Perceptions of Government Effectiveness and Lived Poverty 
The results in Table 7 show that the correlation coefficient for perceptions of government 
effectiveness and lived poverty was -0.312. This result was significant at the 0.01 significance 
level. This also indicates that there was a negative correlation between perceptions of 
government effectiveness and lived poverty. This further demonstrates that low values on the 
perceptions of government effectiveness (which signified perceptions of low government 
effectiveness), were associated with high values of lived poverty which signified higher 
incidences of lived poverty. Table 7 also shows that the shared variance between perceptions of 
government effectiveness and lived poverty was 9.7 per cent. This indicates that there is a very 
small variance shared between perceptions of government effectiveness and lived poverty. 
However, the results suggest that perceptions of poor government effectiveness were associated 
with higher incidences of lived poverty. 
  
4.6.3 Perceptions of Rule of Law and Lived Poverty 
The correlation coefficient for perceptions of the rule of law and lived poverty was -0.093. The 
results in Table 7 suggest that there was a negative correlation between perceptions about the 
rule of law and lived poverty. This demonstrates that low levels of trust in institutions associated 
with the rule of law were associated with higher levels in lived poverty. Table 7 also indicates 
that the shared variance between perceptions of rule of law and lived poverty was 8.6 per cent. 
The result showed that there was a negligible amount of variance shared between the two 
variables. These results were significant at the one per cent level and therefore could not be 
attributed to a chance occurrence. 
 
4.6.4 Perceptions of Voice and Accountability and Lived Poverty 
This study further set out to establish the association between perceptions about democratic 
accountability and lived poverty. The results of this correlation analysis are presented in Table 7. 
The correlation coefficient for the measure of Voice and Accountability and lived poverty was -
0.100. This result showed that there was a negative correlation between the measure of Voice 
and Accountability and lived poverty. Therefore, the evidence shows that low scores on the 
measure of voice and accountability (low satisfaction with democracy and democratic processes) 
were associated with high scores on the lived poverty index (high poverty). The correlation was 
significant at the 0.01 level and the result could not be attributed to a chance occurrence. By 
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calculating the covariance between the measure of Voice and Accountability and lived poverty, it 
was found that only 0.1 per cent of the variation in the measure of Voice and Accountability was 
shared with lived poverty. Therefore, the results demonstrate that perceptions of higher levels of 
democracy and democratic processes were associated with lower levels of lived poverty. 
 
The results presented in this chapter demonstrate that most indicators and perceptions of 
governance were associated with measures of socioeconomic development. These results provide 
statistical evidence of an association between measures concerning governance and of 
socioeconomic development. It is therefore necessary to discuss the results to uncover the 
relationships between the performance of indicators and perceptions of governance and 
development with political and economic reforms that can be associated with the observed 
results. The discussion is provided in the chapter that follows. Methodological concerns relating 
to the indicators used are also discussed. 
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CHAPTER 5  
DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter discusses the research questions by relating them to the findings and literature on 
governance and development. The chapter further discusses factors that may explain some of the 
changes in matters relating to governance and socioeconomic development in Zambia. It also 
reflects on the indicators and methods that were used in the study. 
 
5.1 Governance in Zambia 
This study reveals that between 1996 and 2012, Zambia’s indicators of governance fell into a 
category associated with poor governance. This shows that while there were improvements in the 
scores of the indicators, Zambia had not yet attained levels associated with “good governance”. It 
is instructive to note that by the early 1990s, the political and economic challenges that Zambia 
was faced with could be linked to reforms introduced by governments since attaining 
independence in 1964 as the discussion in this chapter will highlight. 
 
According to Fundanga and Mwaba (1997: 6), at the time of its independence from British 
colonial rule in 1964, “Zambia was a fairly prosperous economy with a well established private 
sector in an open market oriented economy dominated mainly by expatriate business interests, 
multinational corporations and commercial farmers”. Between 1964 and 1991, Zambia went 
through economic and political reforms that had implications on the economy. 
 
On an economic front, state intervention in the economy led to the nationalization of private 
owned companies and mines during the late 1960s (Fundanga and Mwaba, 1997: 6). Due to 
these economic reforms, the Zambian economy was increasingly guided by the state and this was 
evidenced by the proliferation of parastatals and close regulation by the state of the country’s 
mineral resources, particularly the mainstay of the economy, copper. However, the sustainability 
of the state to play a lead role in guiding the economy came under considerable strain during the 
mid-1970s with declines in the international price for copper (Craig, 1999: 1). The fall in copper 
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prices precipitated a decline in Zambian Government revenues and adversely affected the 
country’s economy (Craig, 1999: 65). It is therefore not surprising that by the end of the 1970s, 
there were considerable increases in poverty. 
 
On the political front, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) government of President 
Kenneth Kaunda that had ruled since independence announced a set of political reforms that led 
to the introduction of a one party state. The one party state from 1973 onwards gave rise to an 
authoritarian system of government. As a result, power was increasingly concentrated in 
Kaunda’s hands. 
 
By the end of the 1980s, there was a strong challenge to Kaunda’s rule from trade unions, 
business leaders, church bodies, academics and student movements (Rakner, 2003). As a result, 
Kaunda was forced by a population that had become disillusioned with the political and 
economic governance of the country into holding multiparty democratic elections. The elections 
in 1991 ushered in the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) which reintroduced 
multiparty democracy and implemented a neoliberal economic reform programme. Under the 
aegis of the IMF and the World Bank, the MMD government adopted Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) that were aimed at addressing the underlying structural problems of the 
Zambian economy which included a large and wasteful state sector, inefficient agricultural 
production and an unsustainable policy of food subsidies (Rakner, 2003). 
 
The events discussed above describe the major economic and political reforms that preceded the 
1990s when the first WGI scores were calculated. They also provide a brief insight into some of 
the factors that may have contributed to the performance of governance and socioeconomic 
indicators in Zambia during the 1990s. Further, the discussion makes it possible to establish a 
link between the political and economic history of Zambia and the findings of this study.  
 
The evidence from this study shows that in 1996, Zambia scored the poorest on Government 
Effectiveness of the four indicators relating to governance reported by the WGI. Given that the 
SAPs that were being implemented by the MMD government during the 1990s were 
characterised by austerity measures which included reduced government spending and the 
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elimination of food and agricultural subsidies, it is likely that these measures were directly 
related to perceptions about the effectiveness of the government in delivering social services. 
 
The perceptions that Zambians had about the effectiveness of the government in managing social 
and economic matters shows that although the government was perceived to be effective in 
addressing broader economic concerns, it was not as effective in addressing matters that had a 
direct impact on access to income and the cost of living for many Zambians. This appears to 
confirm the position taken by Hutchinson and Schumacher (1995) who suggested that 
governments in developing countries have an important responsibility of improving the human 
conditions of their citizens. 
 
This study also reveals that Zambia scored poorly on Control of Corruption in 1996. 
Interestingly, it has been reported that corruption became endemic in Zambia during the 1990s 
(Yezi et al, 2013). Round 5 of Afrobarometer provides evidence that a large percentage of 
Zambians believed that some, most or all officials holding public office were engaged in 
corruption in 2012. This was at a time when the WGI showed that Zambia had a score of -0.361 
on Control of Corruption. This indicates that the low WGI score on Control of Corruption was 
confirmed by high perceptions of corruption amongst officials holding public office. Despite 
this, there was a decline in the perceptions of corruption in Zambia in the years after 2002. It is 
very likely that the change in government in 2002 contributed to changes in perceptions of 
corruption in Zambia. The presidency of Levy Mwanawasa is on record of having taken a firm 
stance to address corruption (Yezi et al, 2013). It is not surprising then that in the years after 
2003, the WGI Control of Corruption score gradually improved indicating that the perceptions 
that corruption was being mitigated were higher in the Mwanawasa presidency after 2002 than 
they were during the presidency of Frederick Chiluba between 1991 and 2001. 
 
Between 1996 and 2012, the WGI Rule of Law score improved from -0.645 to -0.403. Of the 
four WGI scores, this presented the smallest amount of change. Also in 2012, Round 5 of 
Afrobarometer showed that more than half of all Zambians had trust in institutions that were 
critical to upholding the rule of law. These institutions included the courts of law and the 
national assembly. It is interesting to note that there were generally high levels of trust in 
institutions tasked with either creating laws or enforcing them at a time when the WGI scores 
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showed that there had been improvements in Rule of Law. It is possible that the trust in these 
institutions could also be associated with the perceptions that corruption was reducing which 
coincided with the efforts to rein in corruption during the presidency of Levy Mwanawasa. 
 
The WGI have consistently shown that Zambia performed best on Voice and Accountability of 
the four indicators of matters relating to governance addressed in this study. The political history 
of Zambia appears to provide some insight into why this might be the case. The political turn of 
events in 1991 that led to the reintroduction of multiparty politics after close to three decades of 
one party rule meant that Zambia had made significant improvements in embracing democracy. 
More than three quarters of Zambians also expressed confidence in the country’s democracy in 
2012 and in the elections held in 2011. 
 
The discussion above shows that the changes in indicators and perceptions of citizens toward 
governance could be attributed, at least in part, to political and economic reforms in the country. 
The study also shows that all four indicators concerning governance took similar trajectories. 
This study therefore takes the position that matters such as corruption, rule of law, democratic 
accountability and the effectiveness of governments affect each other. Given that governance 
involves the general exercise of authority, indicators and perceptions about governance provide   
useful guides of the extent to which the political leadership can act in the interests of citizens and 
effectively manage economic affairs. In Zambia’s case, it is evident from the evidence that 
during the 1990s the political leadership was seen to be exercising its authority poorly at a time 
when the development indicators showed that levels of socioeconomic development were very 
poor. 
 
While it is probable that changes in political leadership may have contributed to changes in 
indicators relating to governance, the increase in the number of individual indicators used to 
compute the WGI may have also contributed to these changes between 1996 and 2012. Related 
to this, the individual indicators that were relied on to compute the WGI were continuously 
broadened to include both objective and subjective measures for their indicators. This suggests 
that over the years the WGI were not necessarily based on the same description. It further 
indicates that what the WGI were measuring may not have been the same thing during the fifteen 
years. This therefore means that the results that were obtained from one year to the next could 
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also have been a reflection of the changes in how the WGI were being measured and what 
exactly they were measuring. However, this study could not ascertain the extent to which 
methodological changes to the WGI contributed to the observed changes in the indictors of 
matters relating to governance. What remained central to this study was to identify statistics that 
could be analysed to investigate whether changes in indicators of matters concerning governance 
were associated with changes in measures of socioeconomic development in Zambia. 
 
5.2 Socioeconomic Development in Zambia 
In 2012, Zambia had an HDI value of 0. 448 and this placed the country in the UNDP’s low 
human development category (UNDP, 2013). Zambia’s 2012 HDI of 0.448 was below the 
average of 0.466 for countries in the low human development group and below the average of 
0.475 for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP, 2013). Zambia was also ranked 163rd out of 
194 countries and territories in terms of its HDI (UNDP, 2013). Clearly, the levels of 
socioeconomic development in Zambia were low going by the 2012 HDI values despite 
improvements since the early 2000s. 
 
In view of the above, it is necessary to draw attention to the trends in Zambia’s development in 
the decades leading to 1990. According to the UNDP (2013) Zambia had an HDI value of 0.405 
in 1980. By 1990, the value had dropped to 0.398 and continued to decline throughout the 1990s 
until 2000 when the HDI returned to 1990 levels (UNDP, 2013). As the evidence shows in this 
study, the HDI continued to rise in the years after 2000 and peaked at 0.448 in 2012. A further 
investigation into the changes in HDI reveals that there were sustained increases in the expected 
years of schooling and in the means years of schooling between 1980 and 2012 (UNDP, 2013). 
However, there was a decline in life expectancy at birth from 52 years in 1980 to 49.4 years in 
2012 (UNDP, 2013). The decline in life expectancy continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
so much that by 2000, life expectancy at birth was only 42 years (UNDP, 2013). It was only after 
2005 that a reversal in the negative trends was witnessed which saw the life expectancy rise 
again towards the 1980 levels. Further investigations show that Zambia’s GNI per capita 
continued to decline every year from the US$ 1,424 value in 1980 to only US$ 0,959 in 1995 
(UNDP, 2013). By the late 1990s, GNI per capita began to increase gradually every year and 
reached US$ 1,358 in 2012 (UNDP, 2013). 
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The changes in Zambia’s HDI can clearly be attributed to significant declines in life expectancy 
at birth and to reductions in GNI per capita. The HIV and AIDS pandemic has contributed 
greatly to the decline in life expectancy.  Projections of life expectancy in Zambia have shown 
that HIV and AIDS was found to have reduced life expectancy by four years in 2000 and the 
figure was projected to rise to eight years by 2010 (UNDP, 2007: 12). The HIV and AIDS crisis 
also put pressure on the Zambian government to devote more financial resources to fighting the 
pandemic at the expense of addressing other diseases. All this was happening at a time when 
government spending on essential services such as healthcare had been significantly reduced due 
to the implementation of austerity measures. It would be useful in this regard to establish the 
extent to which SAPs affected the Zambian government’s ability to address HIV and AIDS 
during the 1990s. However, this was not a focus for this study but could prove useful for future 
studies on governance and socioeconomic development in Zambia. 
 
As noted above, the decline in per capita income also contributed to the decline in human 
development during the 1980s and 1990s. By the early 1990s, Zambia was facing a balance of 
payments deficit as a result of a drop in export revenue and a fiscal deficit as a result of a drop in 
mineral tax revenue (Whitworth, 2013: 20). As a consequence, national income drastically 
reduced and inevitably led to a decline in GNI per capita. Because GNI per capita is viewed as a 
proxy for the typical person’s command over resources that they can use to acquire goods and 
services, and save for the future (Klugman et al 2010), the decline in Zambia’s GNI undoubtedly 
contributed to a significant drop in disposable incomes for most Zambians. This also exacerbated 
poverty levels and led to a reduction in human development. 
 
This study reveals that Zambia’s HDI started to rise in the late 2000s after the continuous decline 
of the 1990s and early 2000s. Between 2005 and 2012, there were consistent increases in life 
expectancy at birth, expected years of schooling, mean years of schooling and GNI per capita 
(UNDP, 2013). Not surprisingly, Zambia’s HDI value made gains each year during this period. It 
is evident that the gains in HDI were a reflection of improvements in healthcare, education and 
national income. By extension, these improvements could also be attributed to economic factors. 
Whitworth (2013) argues that Zambia’s economic recovery became evident in 1999 following 
privatisation of the copper mines and the influx of new investments, as advocated for by SAPs. 
One of the most significant contributors to Zambia’s economic recovery, however, was the rapid 
64 
 
rebound in copper prices in 2003, which was in large part due to increased demand for natural 
resources from emerging economies such as China (Whitworth, 2013). This also meant that 
national revenues began to increase in the early 2000s and contributed to improving the balance 
of payments and to reducing the fiscal deficit (Whitworth, 2013). Another important factor to the 
economic recovery was the reduction in debt levels. This was achieved primarily through the 
completion of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in 2005 (Whitworth, 2013). 
Zambia had joined the HIPC scheme in 2000 in an attempt to receive foreign debt relief by 
adhering to a set of policy reforms agreed to with its creditors (Whitworth, 2013). 
 
In as much as the changes in HDI can be accounted for mostly by the changes in life expectancy 
and GNI per capita, it is also true that the HDI has been subjected to theoretical and 
methodological adjustments. These include the changes in indicators used and the fact that the 
UNDP has made revisions to HDI values for previous years. Added to this is that some of the 
indictors that are used in calculating HDI are provided by sources, such as the Central Statistical 
Office in Zambia, that have not been scrutinized in this study. Despite this, it is clear that the 
updated HDI values present an attempt by the UNDP to give the most accurate measure of 
human development based on the most reliable sources of data. For this reason, it sensible to 
conclude that the changes in Zambia’s HDI are a useful indication of the trends in Zambia’s life 
expectancy, mean years of schooling, expected years of schooling and GNI per capita. Because 
HDI was used as a measure of socioeconomic development, it can also be concluded that the 
trends in Zambia’s socioeconomic development were in part influenced by political and 
economic factors from the 1970s to the 2000s. 
 
When compared to trends in other African countries, it was established that Zambia was one of 
five countries to have had a reduction in lived poverty during the decade 2002 to 2012 (Dulani et 
al 2013: 1). In 2012, the mean score of lived poverty across 34 countries was 1.26 (on a scale of 
0 to 4), where larger scores were associated with high incidences of lived poverty (Dulani et al, 
2013: 9). Zambia had a lived poverty score of 1.23 which indicated that the incidence of poverty 
was slightly less severe than the average for the 34 countries (Dulani et al, 2013: 9). In addition, 
Zambia ranked 13th out of the 34 countries (Dulani et al, 2013: 9). 
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In light of these findings, it is observable that improvements in Zambia’s HDI value were 
accompanied by reductions in lived poverty after 2000. This proves that there have been positive 
gains made in Zambia’s socioeconomic development particularly in the years after 2000. Dulani 
et al (2013: 1) suggest that the reduction in lived poverty in Zambia can be attributed to 
economic growth coupled with investments in infrastructure and social services. While this is the 
case, it is also recognised that the reduction in lived poverty is masked by the fact that the growth 
in Zambia’s economy has not trickled down to the poorest people (Dulani et al, 2013: 1). This 
has been corroborated by this study which has shown that more than three quarters of the 
population have experienced challenges in accessing cash income. 
 
The foregoing discussion provides evidence that periods of low socioeconomic development 
were accompanied by periods during which indicators and perceptions of governance were also 
low. While this study does not argue that governance reform is responsible for development, it is 
necessary to discuss the association between indicators and perceptions of governance and 
measures of socioeconomic development to understand the extent to which changes in 
socioeconomic development can be predicted on the basis of knowledge about indicators and 
perceptions of governance. 
 
5.3 Association between Measures of Governance and Measures of 
Socioeconomic Development in Zambia 
The correlations between the four WGI measures and HDI showed that changes in Control of 
Corruption, Government Effectiveness and Voice and Accountability were all associated with 
changes in HDI. Changes in Rule of Law were not associated with changes in HDI. The findings 
of this study further show that there was a correlation between Zambian citizens’ perceptions 
about Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Voice and Accountability with the incidence 
of lived poverty. On the other hand, the correlation between perceptions about corruption and 
their living conditions were statistically non-significant. 
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5.3.1 The Association between Control of Corruption and Socioeconomic Development in 
Zambia 
The correlation between the WGI measure of Control of Corruption and HDI not only shows that 
there was a strong positive correlation between the two but that this result was the strongest 
correlation between the four indicators relating to governance and HDI. The covariance also 
revealed that 62.7 per cent of changes in HDI were associated with corruption. 
 
This result confirms the findings in Ackay’s study (2006) which found that increases in measures 
of corruption were associated with reductions in human development. The evidence shows that 
perceptions of corruption were on the rise in Zambia during the 1990s and that this coincided 
with a decline in life expectancy and GNI per capita. While the decline in life expectancy can be 
attributed to the impact of HIV/AIDS, the decline in GNI per capita and the concomitant 
increases in poverty in Zambia during the 1990s could have been partly due to the effects of 
corruption.  
 
Interestingly, the correlation between the perceptions that Zambians had about corruption and 
their living conditions proved to be statistically non-significant. A closer look at these results 
reveals a number of facts. First, it has been established that between 2002 and 2012, Zambia was 
one of only five countries that recorded a reduction in the incidence of lived poverty. While 
Zambians still believed that corruption existed in most public institutions, the fact that they 
indicated that the levels of lived poverty were declining demonstrates that lived poverty was on 
the decrease despite the fact that corruption was perceived to be a problem. This helps to 
understand why the perceptions about corruption were not correlated with Lived Poverty. 
 
The second point that this study brings to attention is that the association between Control of 
Corruption and HDI on one hand and the association between citizens’ perceptions about 
corruption and their living conditions on the other hand, presented two different analyses that 
need to be understood separately. In the former, the indices that were used to compute Control of 
Corruption included both objectives and subjective measures of corruption that included data 
from anti-corruption and accounting institutions that attempted to quantify the monetary extent 
of corruption. This also meant that this correlation test provided an indication of the extent to 
which distortions in government spending were associated with the provision of social services 
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such as education and healthcare as well as on income inequality. In the latter correlation test, the 
measure was based on perceptions about corruption in public institutions which were then tested 
against experiences of poverty. It is also helpful to consider that the latter correlation unlike the 
first was not based on time series data and this could also have contributed to the discrepancy in 
these findings.  
 
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it is possible to conclude that over an extended period 
over time, corruption can be associated with reductions in the level of human development. 
Furthermore, it is reasonable to conclude that improvements in the rating of living conditions 
among Zambians in the future are more likely to be achieved alongside perceptions of corruption 
reducing. 
 
5.3.2 The Association between Government Effectiveness and Socioeconomic Development 
in Zambia 
According to the UNDP, the role of the government is important for promoting people centred 
development through the provision of infrastructure, redistribution of income and creating 
employment among others (Hutchinson and Schumacher, 1995). The association between 
measures of Government Effectiveness and of socioeconomic development was confirmed in 
this study. The findings show that 42.5 per cent of the changes in HDI were associated with 
Government Effectiveness. The evidence of this relationship in Zambia is consistent with the 
evidence uncovered in other countries by Hutchinson and Schumacher (1995) who established 
that spending on public, merit and economic goods was associated with HDI. As a matter of fact, 
even the perceptions about the manner in which the government was handling matters was 
associated with the living conditions of Zambians. This confirms the findings of Sacks and Levi 
(2010) who established that the effectiveness of governments was associated with food security 
in 18 African countries. 
 
As noted earlier in this chapter, the Zambian government implemented SAPs during the 1990s 
which in many ways inhibited the government’s ability to invest in physical infrastructure and 
provide social and economic services such as healthcare and jobs respectively. After Zambia 
reached the HIPC completion point in 2005, the Zambian government was in a position to invest 
more in physical infrastructure and social services. This provides a reasonable explanation as to 
68 
 
why improvements in Government Effectiveness in the years after 2000 coincided with 
improvements in HDI during the same period. It is clear from this study that Zambia’s 
socioeconomic development needs to be underpinned by political leadership that has the ability 
to address the areas of the economy that citizens have identified as concerns. 
 
5.3.3 The Association between Rule of Law and Socioeconomic Development in Zambia 
In both correlation tests run in this study, the coefficients for Rule of Law and the measures of 
socioeconomic development were statistically significant. Both results showed that positive 
changes in measures of Rule of Law were associated with positive changes in measures of 
socioeconomic development. The result for the correlation between the WGI measure for Rule of 
Law and HDI showed that 7.9 per cent of the changes in HDI were associated with changes in 
Rule of Law. This result was consistent with the works of Hayek (1963; 1967; 1973) cited in 
Boettke and Subrick (2003) and Mahoney (2000) which found that countries practicing common 
law influenced by liberal democratic values were more likely to have greater real per capita GDP 
growth. This also appears to confirm the findings by Boettke and Subrick (2003) that found that 
Rule of Law had an indirect impact on measures of human well-being such as life expectancy, 
infant mortality, primary and secondary education and illiteracy. According to Boettke and 
Subrick (2003), by contributing to economic growth, Rule of Law had an indirect impact on 
improving human well-being. 
 
The correlation between Rule of Law and HDI in Zambia serves to confirm that there is an 
association between measures of the effectiveness of institutions that are central to the legal 
system and human development outcomes. Zambia turned to a liberal democratic system in the 
early 1990s and this study reveals that there were improvements in Rule of Law in the years after 
2000 which were also accompanied by improvements in HDI. Undoubtedly, this confirms that 
the growth in Zambia’s liberal democracy since the 1990s has contributed to changes in 
socioeconomic development. 
 
The study also shows that high levels of trust in institutions such as the judiciary and parliament 
were associated with low incidences of lived poverty. This confirms the arguments made by 
Kaufmann et al (2010) who suggested that the confidence that citizens have in the rules of 
society and the quality of contract enforcement contributed to improved human well-being. It is 
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reasonable to conclude that the fact that Zambians had considerably high levels of confidence in 
institutions that are crucial to implementing laws and contract enforcement implies that they had 
confidence that their social and economic interests could be protected. This further shows that 
Zambia’s liberal democracy had yielded positive results not only in terms of economic 
performance but also in terms of strengthening legal systems. This study reveals that this was 
more noticeable in the early 2000s around the period when the government took steps to address 
corruption. 
 
5.3.4 The Association between Voice and Accountability and Socioeconomic Development 
in Zambia    
This study has revealed that higher levels in measures of Voice and Accountability were 
associated with improvements in measures of socioeconomic development. The WGI measure 
for Voice and Accountability included indicators that collected data on perceptions about 
democracy and freedoms of association and the media. This shows that statistical evidence of 
being a liberal democracy is associated with improvements in socioeconomic development 
measures. 
 
With regard to Zambia, the fact that six general elections have been held since 1991 highlights 
efforts to enhance the levels of democracy. This is also confirmed by more than three quarters of 
the population who described Zambia as a full democracy and who also described the last 
general elections held in 2011 as being free and fair. While this study focused on democratic 
accountability, it is possible that the extent of Zambia’s democracy could also have been a 
reflection of freedoms of associations and the media. 
 
The association between improvements in measures of Voice and Accountability and 
socioeconomic development in Zambia confirms Bird’s (2008) findings that accountable and 
legitimate governments are more likely to be successful at raising revenues for social and 
economic spending. It follows, therefore, that liberal democratic systems are more likely to 
thrive in environments where positive socioeconomic gains are being made. Since 1996, 
Zambia’s economy and democracy have taken similar trajectories. Though it cannot be inferred 
that Voice and Accountability leads to improved human development and reductions in the 
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incidence of poverty it is evident that high levels in indicators of Voice and Accountability 
coincided with improvements in socioeconomic development in Zambia. 
  
The discussion presented in this chapter shows that measures of matters concerning governance 
such as Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Voice and 
Accountability were associated with changes in measures of socioeconomic development. The 
discussion also highlighted that changes in the measures of socioeconomic development could be 
predicted on the basis of knowledge about changes in the measures concerning governance. This 
also shows that the extent to which the political leadership in Zambia acts to improve institutions 
of governance and implement effective policies can contribute to improvements in the living 
conditions among citizens. The next chapter therefore provides a summary of the study and 
demonstrates why debates regarding governance and development are important for a poor 
country like Zambia. 
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CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Summary 
Good governance and governance are terms that are now embedded in development theory. This 
study has confirmed this by showing that low levels of socioeconomic development are 
associated with low perceptions of governance and poor scores on indicators concerning 
governance in Zambia. The evidence from this study shows that perceptions that Zambian 
citizens have about state institutions and the capacity of the political leadership to formulate and 
implement economic policies provide a strong indication of how Zambians rate their living 
conditions. The results further reveal that statistical measures of governance are very useful for 
predicting changes in measures of socioeconomic development in Zambia. 
 
The knowledge of governance perceptions is therefore very useful for highlighting areas in 
which the Government is seen to be effective or ineffective. It also shows which of the 
institutions charged with upholding the rule of law enjoy or do not enjoy the confidence of the 
public. Coupled with knowledge about perceptions of corruption in key public institutions, this 
study shows the areas and institutions of governance that need to be reformed while also 
highlighting aspects of poverty that need to be addressed in order to achieve higher levels of 
socioeconomic development in Zambia. 
 
Similarly, the satisfaction with democracy and democratic processes amongst Zambians shows 
that democratic governance and free and fair elections are not only important to most Zambians, 
but they are also associated with how they rate their living conditions. This suggests a strong 
sense of belief in certain features of liberal democracy among Zambians and shows that the 
political leadership in Zambia needs to commit itself and be held accountable to guaranteeing 
policies and institutions that promote effective governance for the benefit of the citizens. 
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In as much as this study has relied on WGI survey evidence to provide indicators about 
governance in Zambia, this study takes the position that WGI data may not be reliable for 
informing policy decisions on matters relating to governance and development. The study 
supports the view taken by Thomas (2010) that the Worldwide Governance Indicators provided 
by Kaufmann et al (2010) are subjective and therefore cannot be relied on to reflect actual 
changes in governance. However, when used in conjunction with perceptions of governance and 
living conditions amongst citizens, the WGI can help to provide a more accurate picture of the 
extent to which country statistics on governance and development reflect the views expressed by 
citizens. 
 
6.2 Recommendations  
Governance requires that citizens and the state should have respect for institutions that govern 
economic and social interactions. For this reason, it is necessary for the Zambian Government to 
address challenges in institutions that are charged with controlling corruption and upholding the 
rule of law. It is evident that a large section of the Zambian public either do not trust or believe 
there is widespread corruption in the Zambia Police Force. The same holds true for local 
government councils and government departments. Therefore, it is recommended that the 
Zambian Government prioritises reforming institutions of governance, including those 
mentioned above, in an effort to curb corruption and earn the respect of citizens. 
 
The importance of governance to Zambia’s development has recently been demonstrated by a 
process to enact a new constitution that has been ongoing for close to a decade now. This is 
aimed at providing the Zambians with a constitution that seeks to strengthen democratic 
processes, including methods of selecting and monitoring leaders. As at March 2014, the 
constitution has not been released prompting concerns that matters relating to governance will 
not be addressed adequately in its absence. Against this background, it is recommended that the 
Zambian Government follows through with the relevant provisions that will ensure the timely 
enactment of a constitution that addresses contentious constitutional issues. These include the 
limiting of Presidential powers, the enactment of a Freedom of Information Bill, the inclusion of 
social, political and economic rights in the Bill of Rights and other clauses related to the process 
of electing a president. 
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Furthermore, the Zambian Government needs to ensure that it adopts economic policies that 
adequately address the living conditions of Zambians. Lack of access to income has been 
revealed as a major challenge by a large section of the Zambian population. In this regard, it is 
advisable for the Zambian Government to adopt policies that support job creation. This should be 
accompanied by attempts to devise effective ways of redistributing national wealth and at 
reducing income inequality. Similarly, the Government is implored to ensure that economic 
policies address the levels of human development in Zambia by acting to make further gains in 
improving access to education and the quality of healthcare provision. 
 
Institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and NEPAD are also crucial to Zambia’s governance 
and socioeconomic development. It is recommended that the mentioned institutions should make 
use of data on perceptions of governance and socioeconomic development among Zambians in 
informing their policy decisions toward Zambia and in their engagement with the Zambian 
Government. The role of multilateral institutions should also be central to holding the Zambian 
Government accountable to democratic processes, combating corruption and reforming legal 
institutions. Lastly, the aforementioned institutions have an important role to play in holding the 
Government accountable with regard to the effective utilisation of aid, for the benefit of the 
Zambian people.  
 
Finally, this study takes the position that political leadership is cardinal to the implementation of 
economic policies and reforming institutions of governance that are necessary for addressing 
social and economic challenges and the expansion of human capabilities.  
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A 
WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS DATA FOR ZAMBIA 
 
YEAR 
INDICATORS 
Control of 
Corruption 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Rule of Law Voice and 
Accountability 
1996 -1.02880981 -1.06041546 -0.64542688 -0.39625656 
1998 -0.88067165 -0.85642435 -0.52712951 -0.59887387 
2000 -0.8523834 -0.85829494 -0.53590967 -0.49187078 
2002 -0.93746043 -0.8071887 -0.39413795 -0.36958735 
2003 -0.75977601 -0.82251951 -0.47007405 -0.37658885 
2004 -0.6798695 -0.81642193 -0.52198726 -0.41247646 
2005 -0.78775074 -0.93610067 -0.57597319 -0.4195603 
2006 -0.72872065 -0.81318719 -0.59015402 -0.22470376 
2007 -0.5710554 -0.71129749 -0.57406701 -0.22493035 
2008 -0.47433898 -0.72927626 -0.4397853 -0.18089656 
2009 -0.51320912 -0.79114014 -0.48504741 -0.31957663 
2010 -0.56542897 -0.83001482 -0.49780607 -0.25570043 
2011 -0.47027037 -0.63896442 -0.46860161 -0.19122445 
2012 -0.36075468 -0.50167065 -0.40293132 -0.19122445 
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APPENDIX B 
HDI DATA FOR ZAMBIA 
Zambia HDI Value 
1996 - 
1997 - 
1998 0.42 
1999 - 
2000 0.367 
2001 - 
2002 0.389 
2003 0.394 
2004 0.401 
2005 0.399 
2006 - 
2007 0.411 
2008 - 
2009 0.419 
2010 0.438 
2011 0.443 
2012 0.448 
 
